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Abstract 
 
The aim of the thesis is to provide an interdisciplinary approach to the Anglo-German arms 
race in the early twentieth century by combining press histories and international relations 
theories. The thesis suggests that the British misperceived German naval and imperial 
ambitions and pressed for a retraction of German power and an increase in Britain’s naval 
budget. British misperceptions of Germany were exacerbated by the British press, 
newspapers and editors. The press exacerbated Anglo- German antagonisms by issuing 
hostile publications throughout their pages which caused a misperception of foreign and 
naval policy. Moreover, British attempts to secure its trade routes across the globe had the 
unintentional effect of making Germany less secure. 
The thesis provides a chronological account of the Anglo-German arms race. Topics 
discussed in the thesis include Foreign Office affairs, personal relationships between 
journalists and politicians and a break-down of the principal newspapers in circulation in 
Britain and Germany. The thesis will also trace Anglo-German insecurity explaining how the 
press aggravated a sensitive situation. The thesis will address the underlying hostilities in 
Anglo-German relations and attribute them to the press. 
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‘I am but a comparatively young journalist, but I have seen Cabinets upset, Ministers driven 
into retirement, laws repealed, great social reforms initiated, Bills transformed, estimates 
remodelled, Acts passed, governors appointed, armies sent hither and thither, war 
proclaimed, and war averted by the agency of newspapers’ 1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
1 William T Stead - ‘Government by Journalism’ 1889 – former editor of Pall Mall. 
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The German Naval Menace: The Relationship between the Press and 
Diplomacy in the Dreadnought Era 1904-1914, an Era of Misperception? 
 
Chapter I. Introduction & Historiography  
 
Foreign politics are the relations between so many bands of outlaws. 
There are seldom any strong ties between the parties, either language or 
history or neighbourhood or habits; very often there are traditions of 
positive hostility and mutual dislike.2 
 
Philip Hammond, Chancellor of the Exchequer, announced in late October 2018 a £1 billion 
investment into Her Majesty’s Armed Forces. The investment is aimed at the Dreadnought 
programme, a class of four submarines destined for the Senior Service. The four 
Dreadnought class submarines will be charged with providing the ‘continuous at-sea nuclear 
deterrent’ on behalf of the United Kingdom into the late 2060s. The submarines will host 
Trident nuclear warheads which are expected to cost an estimated £31 billion over their 
lifetime.3 Coupled with the renewal of the Trident nuclear missile system, the announcement 
induced a cause célèbre, splitting public and political opinion in the United Kingdom. 
Numerous media campaigns by prominent political figures have highlighted the ethical and 
financial implications of renewing Trident.4 However, with threats of Islamic extremism and 
an expansionist China in the Far East, the renewal of Trident is looking like an increasing 
necessity. Moreover, with the ongoing challenges of Brexit and a resurgent Russia, the 
Royal Navy is adopting an increased international presence, ‘showing the flag’ around the 
globe.5 Controversy apropos the expense of armaments is not an aberration of British naval 
history, the contemporary debate drawing comparisons with the Dreadnought Era.  
The thesis provides an interdisciplinary approach to the Anglo-German naval arms race by 
incorporating press history and international relations (IR) theories. The thesis takes 
                                                            
2 Murray & Gilbert. The Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey, 1906-1915. 
https://archive.org/details/foreignpolicyofs00murr/page/40. p.41  
3 Policy Paper – gov.uk - Dreadnought Submarine Programme: Factsheet. The names of ships have 
been announced as HMS Dreadnought, Warspite, Valiant & King George VI.  
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/successor-submarine-programme-factsheet/successor-
submarine-programme-factsheet  
4 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/may/02/nuclear-arms-westminster-abbey-jesus-
weapons The Guardian provides just one example of how controversial the topic of Trident has 
become in the UK press.  
5 HMS Montrose, a Type 23 frigate has been forward deployed to Bahrain on a three-year operation. 
See https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/hms-montrose-arrives-in-bahrain-for-three-year-deployment/ for 
further information.  
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inspiration from political psychology and the IR theory of ‘misperception’ provided by Robert 
Jervis. Jervis’ seminal work attributes misunderstanding and misperception of US-Soviet 
policy as the cause of the Cold War. Jervis asserted that there has been ‘little attention paid 
to the general questions of how adversaries were perceived’.6 Jervis’ seminal work will be 
addressed in full throughout the literature review. The thesis will examine whether the IR 
theory of misperception can be utilised in the context of the Anglo-German arms race and 
discuss the possibility of a potential Anglo-German misperception caused by British and 
German newspapers. The thesis will seek to demonstrate that misperception was 
perpetuated by the press of both nations, who utilised its power au fond for their own 
purpose. It is the aim of the research to fill similar gaps regarding the Anglo-German arms 
race in the early twentieth century. The thesis will also explore the issue of public opinion, 
and the impact of journalists and political posturing on Anglo-German relations throughout 
the Dreadnought Era. The thesis will also introduce key newspaper proprietors, such as Lord 
Northcliffe and Charles Scott MP and their effect on newspaper publications. 
The thesis will argue that British foreign policy towards Germany produced a self-fulfilling 
prophecy and will discuss concepts of IR theories. The British misperceived Germany as 
aggressive due to their imperial and naval ambitions which was exacerbated by the press. 
This in turn led to Germany viewing the British as aggressive. Consequently, Britain pushed 
for the retraction of German power, leading to polemics in the German press against Britain. 
The British also failed to see that in aligning themselves with France and Russia, in an 
attempt to increase their own security, it contributed to German insecurity. Conversely, 
Germany’s attempts to alienate Britain from France and Russia had the adverse effect.7 
Ergo, the arms race was a cycle of misperception aggravated by the press. It is worth noting 
that Germany did pose a credible threat to Britain, however this threat was exacerbated by 
the press. 
The IR model utilised for the research is the ‘spiral model’. The spiral model indicates that 
Britain’s aspiration to secure its trade routes led to an increase in naval expenditure. This 
had the unintentional effect of menacing an insecure Germany, looking to increase its 
imperial assets. Britain’s drive for economic security and defence produced actions, 
perceived by Germany as hostile. Consequently, German press outlets pressed for an 
increase in naval budget which can be partially attributed to the Anglo-German arms race. 
The thesis suggests that both British and German politicians were aware of these events 
                                                            
6 Jervis, R. (2017). Perception and Misperception in International Politics. 2nd ed. Woodstock: 
Princeton University Press. P. xvi 
7 Ibid. p. 89 
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and actively sought an ‘understanding’. However, polemics in the press aggravated the 
situation and estranged the two countries.  
The principal theme of the research concerns the relationship between the press and 
diplomacy. The thesis will demonstrate that the press created an Anglo – German 
misperception. This will be done by utilising a number of British sources, including papers 
from the National Archives, Parliamentary Archives and numerous online resources such as 
the British Newspaper Archive. The sources incorporate Admiralty, Foreign Office and 
Committee of Imperial Defence papers. Moreover, the British Newspaper Archive presents 
the historian with an opportunity to study regional and local newspapers which provides the 
thesis with a unique angle on public opinion. Through the use of these sources the thesis will 
attempt to demonstrate that the press aggravated the relationship between Britain and 
Germany apropos invasion scares and imperial ambitions.  
The thesis will demonstrate that government officials in Britain and Germany were open to 
the idea of an Anglo-German ‘understanding’.8 However, through the use of the British 
Newspaper Archive and multiple sources the thesis will argue that public opinion on both 
sides of the North Sea were opposed to any such proposal. This was exacerbated by 
newspaper articles published in both Britain and Germany. Public opinion became 
increasingly important throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century. Three political 
events led to an increase in public participation in government affairs in Britain. In 1883, 
legislation passed to rein in electoral disruption which was subsequently followed by the 
1884 redistribution of parliamentary seats. Moreover, the 1885 Third Reform Act extended 
the franchise paving the way for men over the age of thirty, with a property, to vote in 
general elections. These events led to increased anxiety in parliament, which prior to the 
reform acts was a partisan world apropos defence. The fear in Parliament revolved around 
how public opinion would shape defence matters. The political events of the 1880s coincided 
with the industrialisation of Germany and warfare. The term ‘Dreadnought Era’ is 
characterised by the commissioning of HMS Dreadnought into the Royal Navy in 1906 
[appendix 4]. This revolutionary battleship will be discussed in further detail in Chapter IV.  
Reform acts in late nineteenth-century Britain led to increased fears in the imperial minded 
Conservative party viz. naval defence. Increased public participation in government policy 
led to the advent of the Navy League in 1894. The Navy League provide one of the leading 
examples of political pressure groups in the Dreadnought Era. The League informed the 
public of Royal Navy events and topical news. ‘There was a belief in the Navy League that 
                                                            
8 Head of the German Navy League, Admiral von Kӧster on the British. Sir Edward Goschen to Sir 
Edward Grey. Annual Report 1909. 24th June 1910. FO 881/9708/2 
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there is a working man to be converted. The working man’s club echo with socialist 
denunciations and detractions of an imperial policy. He is only half convinced of the value of 
our Empire’.9 How could pressure groups such as the Navy League convert and garner 
support of the lay man?  
The Times introduced the British public to the notion of Germany’s ‘risk fleet’ theory in 1906, 
noting that ‘Germany must have a fleet of such strength that even for the mightiest naval 
power a war with her would involve such risks as to jeopardise its own supremacy’.10 The 
‘risk fleet’ theory was calculated by Admiral Tirpitz in 1897, who believed the policy would 
furnish Germany with political leverage.11 The Anglo-German arms race is an era defined by 
populism and press barons. Press barons were aware of the financial gain and political 
leverage they wielded. The rise of press barons coincided with a new wave of journalism and 
presentation styles. The thesis will explore the concept of ‘new wave journalism’ and press 
barons in further detail whilst providing context viz. newspaper readership, circulation and 
demographics in Chapter II. 
*** 
The Anglo-German arms race has been discussed ad nauseam, however as this thesis will 
demonstrate there is a lacuna in the historiography.12 German foreign policy in the early 
twentieth century had been to ‘increase military capability through expansion whilst utilising 
diplomatic means to placate the British and demonstrate Germany as a friendly power.’13 
However, according to Foreign Office papers, the pan-Germanic press did not tow the official 
line and instead aggravated the situation, drawing criticism from the Imperial Government 
and British press. Furthermore, a series of British novels produced between 1871 and 1914 
under the banner of so called ‘Invasion Literature’ arguably agitated public imagination. The 
publications began with a novel titled The Battle for Dorking (1871) which captured the 
imagination of the public. Further novels were turned in to publications in the press. Invasion 
literature raised genuine fears of German invasion in the British psyche. Decades of 
European peace were induced by the post-Napoleonic policy of a European ‘balance of 
power’. 
                                                            
9 Coetzee, F. (2011). For Party or Country. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press. p.23 
10 "The Naval Question and Anglo-German Relations." The Times, 11 Jan. 1906, p. 9. The Times 
Digital Archive, 
11 Mahnken, T., Maiolo, J. and Stevenson, D. (2016). Arms Races in International Politics. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. p.22 – see chapter I for an in-depth analysis of Tirpitz plans and 
historiography of the Anglo-German arms race. 
12 Key historians include, Arthur Marder, Jon Sumida, Christopher Bell and Matthew Seligmann. Vide 
the literature review for further context.  
13 The History of the Times. Vol. 3. (1947). London. The Twentieth Century Test 1884 -1912. p.344 
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Local branches of the Navy League initiated new schemes to garner public support for the 
Royal Navy. Consequently, according to further Foreign Office reports, British press organs 
and political pressure groups were accused of Machiavellian duplicity by the German press. 
Public interest in the Royal Navy and foreign affairs had lapsed throughout the nineteenth 
century, signified by the fall of Napoleon in 1815.14 One policy of the Navy League was to 
reignite passion for the navy by celebrating Trafalgar Day. For many, the Royal Navy was a 
force for good in the world, but the patriotic sentiments of Trafalgar were a distant memory. 
This was due in part to a limited threat of invasion which was enjoyed by Victorian Britain. 
The Navy League raised awareness of the stagnation in the Royal Navy, which appalled the 
public, who in turn pressurised the government to stop the rot. The strain between domestic 
and foreign politics threatened at points to derail the Liberal Party. The party was elected in 
1905 on the pledge of adopting a series of social welfare programmes, including pensions, 
creating fiscal tensions when naval expenditures could not be checked. 
As stated, the purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate the ability of the press to distort 
foreign policy and examine whether the IR model of misperception can be used in the 
context of the Anglo-German arms race. By providing a systematic approach, the paper will 
also address how influential political and naval figures leaked information to selected 
confidants in the press to sway public opinion. The thesis of this paper is split into a series of 
chapters, ranging from the relationship between the press and the public, scandals and 
imperial defence. There are well documented cases of the exuberant Admiral John Fisher 
utilising the press for his own goals by feeding close confidants such as W. T. Stead 
pertinent information to sway public opinion in his favour. Another famous case involved the 
malcontent Lord Charles Beresford, disenfranchised by Admiral Fisher’s reforms, sending a 
damning letter to the Prime Minister which was published in The Times in April 1909. The 
letter claimed that Fisher’s reforms were leading the country into jeopardy and led a public 
inquiry. The fallout of the letter split Admiralty and public opinion and demonstrated how 
newspapers could be used as an intra-departmental weapon, which is examined further 
through newspaper articles discussed in Chapter IV. Throughout the era, Fisher, primus inter 
pares at the Admiralty, utilised his contacts in the press to ‘convert’ the laymen of the country 
back to the Admiralty.15 The diary of Charles Scott, the former Liberal MP, journalist and 
                                                            
14 Marder, A. (1940). The Anatomy of British Sea Power; a history of British Naval Policy in the pre-
Dreadnought Era, 1880-1905. 1st ed. New York: A.A. Knopf. p.243 
15 Marder, A. (1940). The Anatomy of British Sea Power; a history of British Naval Policy in the pre-
Dreadnought Era, 1880-1905. 1st ed. New York: A.A. Knopf. Marder provides evidence of Admiral 
Fisher providing certain information to W.T. Stead at Pall Mall. Admiral Fisher primus inter pares at 
the Admiralty, was one of the most influential naval figures of the twentieth century, his relationship 
with press and journalists will be discussed in detail. 
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proprietor of the Manchester Guardian highlights internal division in the press. Scott’s diary 
has been consulted for the purpose of the thesis.  
The intrusion of non-diplomatic forces in politics, chiefly the press, were to blame for 
exacerbating an Anglo-German misperception. Focusing on the private papers of key 
journalists and politicians is a key aspect of the thesis. Valentine Chirol, The Times military 
and foreign affairs correspondent, au courant with German and Continental politics, had 
shared numerous trips with a young, impressionable, Winston Churchill prior to his political 
career.16 By researching the key differences between private papers, Cabinet papers and 
Admiralty memos, it provides the opportunity to assess what was published in national and 
regional newspapers.  
The bulk of the research was undertaken at the National Archives in London, and the 
Parliamentary Archives at Westminster Palace. Hansards Parliamentary Papers, The Times 
Digital Archive, the British Library and the National Newspaper Archive have all been 
consulted. The thesis seeks to demonstrate the malign relationship between the press and 
the public. Public opinion combined with the press often exerted its influence on foreign 
policy. In the words of British diplomat, Charles Hardinge, public opinion formed ‘the most 
serious danger to our relations with Germany’.17 The issue of ‘spy mania’ and the ‘invasion 
bogey’ which gripped Britain and Germany throughout the era will be addressed in Chapter 
IV. The thesis incorporates local, regional and national newspapers.  
*** 
The advent of a unified Germany in 1871 was welcomed in Britain. Aside from dynastic and 
religious ties, Germany acted as a bulwark against France and Russia. However, as early as 
1897, Germany appeared on the British radar as a potential threat to national security.18 Two 
major war scares in 1885 and 1893 had demonstrated that the French and Russian military 
threat was not as serious as first thought and public imagination turned to German naval 
ambitions. By 1904 the French threat had been all but eliminated by the signing of the 
entente and Asiatic issues had been shored up by the Japanese Alliance. The de facto 
American naval sphere was respected by the Admiralty and Russian naval ambitions had 
been checked by the Japanese at Tsushima, leaving Germany as the bête noire. Edward 
Grey noted in a speech to parliament in 1912 that the ‘reassertion of the maintenance of 
                                                            
16 The History of the Times. Vol. 3. (1947). London. The Twentieth Century Test 1884 -1912 p.73 
17 Otte, T. (2011). The Foreign Office Mind. 1st ed. Cambridge University Press. P.325 – forms part of 
the Hardinge papers located at Cambridge University.  
18 Vide the literature review for differing interpretations and historiography concerning the advent of 
German naval power.  
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British friendship with France and Russia as the starting point, or, as Mr Bonar Law preferred 
to put it, as the key note of British foreign policy’.19 With the Anglo-Russian Convention 
ratified in August 1907, relations with the two former foes significantly improved. 
How did Anglo-German antagonism reach fever pitch in the Dreadnought Era? The 
Japanese and Americans strove economically and challenged British hegemony. Britain 
managed these threats by signing an alliance with former and decrying any agitation with the 
latter.20 Did the Japanese and Americans pose a threat to Britain? Geographically no, but 
economically yes. However, the polemics of the British press were never directed against 
these powers and the threat of invasion, non-existent. The German press declared the 
British people ‘unaccountable and exceedingly prejudiced, and obstinate as mules in lending 
no ear to both sides of a question’.21 The research will provide examples of jingoistic 
nationalism in British and selected German newspapers and highlight political scandals, 
calamities and misdemeanours, such as the Kaiser’s interview with the Daily Telegraph in 
October 1908. One limitation of the thesis is that it does not consult a wide variety of 
German sources due to language restrictions.  
British naval policy throughout the nineteenth century has become synonymous with the 
‘two-power standard’, a term first coined by Lord Hamilton in 1889.22 The policy enabled 
Britain to maintain a fleet larger than the next two powers combined. However, this policy 
altered throughout the Dreadnought Era due to the German threat and is now viewed as a 
political rather than military policy.23 The challenge of the Franco- Russian Entente and 
subsequent rise of Germany as an economic naval power began to strain British finances. 
The dearth in war experience for nearly a century severely hampered the Royal Navy’s 
technological and strategic understanding of modern warfare.24 Moreover, the growing strain 
of imperial security and home defence seriously hampered the British economy. Friedberg’s 
weary titan theory asserts that Britain experienced a period of relative decline throughout the 
                                                            
19 "Sir Edward Grey's Speech." Times [London, England] 12 July 1912: 5. The Times Digital Archive. 
Web. 12 Nov. 2018 
20 Marder, A. (1940). The Anatomy of British Sea Power; a history of British Naval Policy in the pre-
Dreadnought Era, 1880-1905. 1st ed. New York: A.A. Knopf. The economic competition provided by 
the United States strained tensions, but any thought of hostility was viewed by the British as 
incestuous.  
21 Otte, T. (2011). The Foreign Office Mind. 1st ed. Cambridge University Press. P.326 
22 Marder, A. (1940). The Anatomy of British Sea Power; a history of British Naval Policy in the pre-
Dreadnought Era, 1880-1905. 1st ed. New York: A.A. Knopf. Marder p.105 
23 Lambert, N. (2003). Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution. 1st ed. Columbia, SC: University of South 
Carolina Press. P.17 
24 Seligmann, M. (2018). A Service Ready for Total War? The State of the Royal Navy in July 1914. 
The English Historical Review, 133(560), p. 107 All major works on the pre-Dreadnought Era Royal 
Navy appear to charge the Admiralty of becoming technologically inferior to Germany. See Marder’s 
Anatomy for further context.  
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period of 1895 to 1905, due to external economic pressure and domestic reforms.25 
Conversely, arguments have been made suggesting that throughout the Dreadnought Era, 
Britain was simply rebalancing and readjusting in the fall out of the Boer War. Either way, it 
is evident that the Dreadnought Era was a liminal period which witnessed the transformation 
of the Royal Navy from an antiquated force into a modern fighting fleet.  
*** 
The main methodological issue faced throughout the research concerns bias. Dealing with 
bias has been a generational challenge faced by historians. It is evident in The History of the 
Times that there is open bias throughout the Dreadnought Era. The literature claims the 
paper had made friendly overtures to Germany and that there was a ‘sincere desire’ for a 
‘permanent friendship’.26 However, it is evident from the research that publications in The 
Times caused agitation in Germany. By 1897, George Saunders, Berlin Correspondent at 
The Times foresaw the hostility of German foreign and naval policy. Saunders believed that 
Germany and Britain were on an unavoidable collision course, stating that ‘England must 
reckon with these things and answer German naval expansion with energy and speed’.27 
The subsequent course of events would prove these fateful words correct. The German 
naval bills were a tocsin of German imperial ambitions.  
The thesis will demonstrate through the use of British documents and newspapers that the 
German naval policy towards Britain was not a linear policy. In fact, it was multifaceted. 
Germany was not only concerned with British foreign policy, on the contrary, Germany were 
also concerned with French, Russian, Japanese, Italian, Austro-Hungarian and American 
policies. The powerful French and Russian armies that sat to the east and west of Germany 
caused alarm inside the state. Moreover, the Italian foreign policy vacillated between the 
Triple Alliance and closer ties with Britain. Therefore, the theory that German naval planning 
was simply aggressive is flawed and the gamut of German foreign policy, multi-faceted. 
Moreover, in response to the actions and policies of its adversaries, Germany misperceived 
British actions as attempted encirclement. With the benefit of hindsight, historians are able to 
draw inferences from the evidence presented to them. As discussed in Wilson’s The Policy 
of the Entente, British statesmen were unable to deduce inferences from the information 
                                                            
25 Friedberg, A. (2010). The Weary Titan. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. A paragraph in 
Chapter III is dedicated to the issue of bias.  
26 The History of the Times. Vol. 3. (1947). London. The Twentieth Century Test 1884 -1912 p.73 
27 The History of the Times. Vol. 2. (1947). London. The Tradition Established 1841-1884 p.299 
Private correspondence between George Saunders and Wallace.  
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provided to them when studying German foreign policy.28 However, for the decision makers 
at the time it was decisively harder for them to draw the same inferences from the 
information presented to them. Therefore, the axiom that German naval policy was solely 
aggressive is misguided. 
It is not the purpose of this paper to enter into the current contemporary debate between 
revisionist and post-revisionist arguments concerning the Dreadnought. It is hoped that the 
paper contributes positively to the understanding of the Dreadnought Era through an 
interdisciplinary approach. With the recent centenary of the First World War it provides a 
poignant opportunity to explore a new angle of the Anglo- German naval arms race. The 
thesis is split into four chapters providing context to Dreadnought Era through a press angle. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
28 Wilson, K. (2009). The Policy of the Entente. 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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Historiography 
The Dreadnought Era provides a surfeit of historiographical debate, laid out on a tapis for the 
historian to indulge in. The literature review will begin by assessing the seminal works of 
Arthur J Marder. Marder produced his ground-breaking literature The Anatomy of British Sea 
Power (hereafter Anatomy) in the 1940s and was privy to certain documents which are no 
longer available. By the 1980s the orthodox interpretation of the Dreadnought Era was 
critiqued by a group of revisionist historians. Nicholas Lambert shifted the focus of the 
debate onto the financial limitations of the British, suggesting that Marder ignores the 
financial aspect of the era. Lambert also suggests that throughout the Dreadnought Era, 
France and Russia were always Britain’s primary threat.  
The most contentious historiographical debate revolves around when Germany was 
perceived to be Britain’s primary naval threat. The orthodox opinion suggests that Fisher’s 
reforms were designed to meet the threat of Germany. However, Lambert and his revisionist 
cohort claim that Fisher’s reforms were financially motivated and that instead Fisher was 
more concerned by Franco-Russian ambitions and imperial defence. Post- revisionist 
historians have recently challenged the revisionist interpretations of the Dreadnought 
‘revolution’ and instead view the era as an ‘evolution’.  Moreover, the role of the press has 
received scant attention in shaping British and German foreign policy. Although addressed 
by several historians, focus on this relatively new discipline has received insufficient scrutiny.  
Orthodox Interpretation of the Dreadnought Era 
Marder’s Anatomy attempted to provide context to British naval ideology over the period of 
1880-1905. Throughout the course of his career, Marder instilled himself as the doyen of 
British naval history. His epoch set out by outlining the causes of naval expansion and 
evolution of naval architecture. Marder provided ample footnotes which assist the reader 
with deciphering the long chronological narrative of the period. Marder had privileged access 
to certain Admiralty documents and was ‘granted special access by the Admiralty to a 
number of confidential printed policy papers from Fisher’s time’.29 One of the core themes of 
the book concerns Admiral Fisher’s reforms. Marder picked his way through the numerous 
                                                            
29 Sumida, J. (1995). Sir John Fisher and the Dreadnought: The Sources of Naval Mythology. The 
Journal of Military History, 59(4), p.628 
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war scares of the era with great efficiency and detail. Further events discussed include the 
Fashoda Incident, the ‘Invasion Bogey’ and Dreadnought Scare.  
The British press viewed German naval expansion as a direct antagonism to Britain, even at 
this early stage. The press did not believe that Germany needed a large fleet for ‘defence’.30 
Parenthetically, the Teutophobic nature of the press led to an invasion scare over the winter 
of 1904-1905 in Germany, suggesting the press had the ability to create misperceptions. The 
invasion scares in Germany led to Christmas leave being cancelled and the fleet stationed in 
the Orient to be recalled to the North Sea.31 Moreover, The Sun called for the Royal Navy to 
‘Copenhagen’ the German fleet, reminiscent of the Napoleonic Wars.32 The conservative 
and radical press organs asserted that a Copenhagen style attack on the German Fleet 
would lead to a peaceful Continent. Further chapters are dedicated to how public opinion 
was reflected in naval ideology and discusses ‘starvation theory’ and naval league 
propaganda.  
Although pre-dating the Dreadnought Era, Marder provided a brilliant analysis of the rise of 
the German threat. Anatomy clearly defined how Germany became the primary threat to 
Britain and attributed Fisher’s reforms to the ratification of the German Naval Bills. Anatomy 
also addressed the Naval Defence Act of 1889. The chapter discussed how W. T Stead’s, 
close confidant of Fisher, articles in Pall Mall helped shape public opinion in favour of the 
Royal Navy. Marder asserted that in 1888, France was still the Bête Noir of Britain. Marder 
then navigates Anglo- German and French relations at the turn of the twentieth century, the 
1904 Entente with France, German naval expansion, Weltpolitik, and the risk fleet theory. 
Marder concludes Anatomy by summing up Anglo-German ‘estrangement’, asserting that 
German foreign policy was the root cause.33  
Marder’s second publication is titled From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow (hereafter 
Scapa). Volume One of Scapa is split into two fundamental themes. Firstly, Marder focuses 
on Admiral Fisher and his reforms. The book then meanders through various events 
including the Beresford Inquiry, in which, as described by Historian O. Hale, ‘the author is 
solidly but judiciously on Fisher’s side’.34 Beresford’s use of the press to attack Fisher led to 
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a public inquiry, in which the complaints of Beresford were dismantled, the Beresford Inquiry 
will be addressed in Chapter IV. Marder also provided context to the various war scares and 
the 1909 Dreadnought crisis. Secondly, Marder moves on to the Anglo-German naval arms 
race, including principal themes of the Agadir Crisis, Haldane Mission and Churchill’s naval 
holiday plan.  
Marder utilised a wide range of sources to draw his conclusions. Scapa benefited from 
Marder’s vast wealth of knowledge viz. the personalities of military officers and politicians. 
Marder negotiated the period by using sources from the British press, personal memoirs and 
German papers from the Ministry of the Marine. Not only did Marder utilise official papers, he 
scrutinised personal memoirs and papers of several key officers including Fisher, Jellicoe, 
Churchill and Asquith. Scapa is a sound, authoritative read that is full of scholarly sagacity. 
However, revisionist historians have critiqued Marder’s approach to documentary evidence 
labelling him a ‘scissors and paste’ historian, one that could only read and make no 
interpretation of what was in front of him.35  
Revisionist Account of the Dreadnought Era 
Jon Sumida’s Sir John Fisher and the Dreadnought: The Source of Naval Mythology 
(hereafter Mythology) published in 1995, challenged the pre-revisionist account of the naval 
arms race. Sumida claimed that the primary evidence utilised to support the argument is 
flawed. Sumida asserted that to most historians, the narrative of the Dreadnought and 
Fisher’s policies behind the capital ship were straightforward. However, revisionist studies 
shed a different light on Fisher’s capital ship policy, namely the advent of the battlecruiser.36 
Mythology challenged the long-standing theories of the Dreadnought Era. Sumida asserted 
that the major pre-revisionist accounts utilise three main sources.37 Sumida claimed that the 
pre-revisionist primary sources and narrative ‘appears to be upheld by a compelling body of 
primary evidence’.38 Sumida then questioned whether historical research is plagued by the 
same issues as described above. Sumida asserted that the financial difficulties faced by the 
Admiralty were far more complex than illustrated through parliamentary debates, which 
depicts an ideological battle between left and right in political terms. Sumida argued that the 
debate surrounding the Dreadnought did not occur in Parliament due to the leadership of the 
parties supporting the policy in general. Instead Sumida insisted the debate raged in the 
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public sphere, citing that ‘Fisher’s critics were thus compelled to mount their main attacks in 
the press’.39 Moreover, Sumida conceded that the press had a role in British naval policy.  
In Defence of Naval Supremacy (hereafter Supremacy) traced the relationship between the 
Admiralty and technology. Sumida suggested that Fisher favoured the construction of 
battlecruisers over battleships.40 Sumida discussed issues of Aim Correction (AC) which had 
plagued the Royal Navy for years. Sumida negotiated the technical aspects of the invention 
and the financial aspects which hindered its progress. Effective AC plagued the navy due to 
the pitch, roll and yaw of the new all-big-gun ships. The narrative revolved around Arthur 
Pollen and his invention, the Argo Clock. Sumida outlined the long battle between the 
Admiralty and Pollen apropos commission, reliability and funding. Sumida shone a spotlight 
on the technological ambivalence shown by the Admiralty, especially towards AC. The other 
notable finding of the literature concerned public opinion and The Times. A number of 
publications under a pseudonym were published in support of the Argo Clock in an attempt 
to galvanise public interest. The publicist, John Walter, was a shareholder in both The Times 
and Argo, Pollen’s company. This demonstrates that journalists and newspaper proprietors 
were financially motivated and utilised the press to increase their sales. The thesis hopes to 
build on the findings of Sumida. 
 
Nicholas Lambert attempted to redefine the historiography of the naval arms race between 
Britain and Germany by focusing on the financial aspect of the era.41 Sir John Fisher’s Naval 
Revolution (hereafter Revolution) was first published in 1999 followed by Admiral Sir John 
Fisher and the Concept of Flotilla Defence 1904-1909 (hereafter Flotilla) provided a 
revisionist account of the arms race.42 Lambert asserted that Fisher’s reforms were 
motivated primarily by financial limitations imposed by the Liberal government. Lambert 
argued that Fisher’s redistribution of the fleet was not motivated by increases in German 
naval capability. A critique of Lambert concerns his methodology. By focusing on domestic 
and financial limitations, he ignores the ascension of German naval power. However 
important domestic factors were, it is deplorable to ignore the ascension of Germany as a 
naval power. Another notable historian connected with the concept of ‘flotilla defence’ is 
Richard Dunley. Dunley produced an article in 2017 titled Invasion, raids and army reform: 
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the political context of ‘flotilla defence’, which argued that the Admiralty’s new strategy was 
simply a political ploy to secure naval funding from the government.43  
Revolution outlined a historiographical debate concerning Britain’s primary naval threat in 
the Dreadnought Era. Lambert asserted that pre-revisionist historians, such as Marder, 
generally agree that there was a definitive shift in Britain’s diplomacy viz. Germany 1902-
1906. This shift in policy is to be regarded as the moment when Germany became the bête 
noir. A revisionist group of scholars have tried to alter this interpretation and instead suggest 
that Russia was the primary threat to Britain in the Dreadnought Era. Lambert suggested 
that imperial considerations outweighed domestic affairs. Revolution stated that new 
evidence, which Lambert failed to outline, suggested that Fisher had greater imperial 
ambitions than first thought.44  
Lambert’s work contained sweeping statements and contentious views which are not 
furnished with adequate citations. Moreover, there was a lack of sources deriving from 
Germany. Lambert asserted that the redistribution of the fleet in 1904 had no strategic 
purpose. Instead Lambert suggested that it was simply an economic consequence of the 
dismal financial outlook facing the Unionist government. However, Lambert frequently linked 
strategical concerns of the era back to Germany and then addresses the German threat in 
chapter nine. Following these assertions Lambert then disengages from the debate and 
suggested that his work will not enter the debate.45 Furthermore, Lambert claimed that 
previous historians had not fully developed the historiography of the Fisher-Beresford feud, 
even though Marder devoted a chapter on the subject.46  
Lambert suggested the Admiralty were not technologically impaired, as charged by Sumida, 
but then provided evidence contradictory to his initial claim.47 Moreover, Lambert critiqued 
Marder’s work but did not provide ample citations to back up his statements, examples of 
this is evident throughout Chapter VIII.48 Lambert discussed Churchill’s attempts to initiate 
reductions in naval expenditure by directly approaching Germany for a ‘naval holiday’. The 
appeal to Germany fell on deaf ears and consequently the government received a stark 
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warning of a planned expansion of the High Seas Fleet, the Novelle.49 Lambert then 
proceeded by explaining the subsequent abandonment of planned cuts to the Royal Navy 
and redistribution of the fleet to meet the German threat. A further revisionist historian of 
note is Keith Wilson who produced The Policy of the Entente in 1985, which will be 
addressed throughout the thesis.50 It is evident from this that the traditional historiography 
concerning the period still merits attention.   
International Relations Theory 
Perception and Misperception in International Politics (hereafter Misperception) focused on 
US-Soviet relations throughout the Cold War. Jervis attempted to explain how both countries 
misperceived the other’s intentions as aggressive. The theory is based on how the two 
superpowers ‘perceived’ one another, Jervis asserting that the discipline had previously 
received scant attention.51 The model of misperception being utilised for the purpose of this 
thesis is the ‘spiral model’. Misperception addressed the spiral and deterrence model along 
with numerous alternative IR theories. Jervis suggested that the ‘problem’ facing policy-
makers is forming an accurate perception of the other because the other’s behaviour is 
usually ambiguous, and deception is an ever-present possibility’.52 The second edition of 
Misperceptions utilised for the thesis began with a ninety-page preface in which Jervis 
addressed a few key issues. Jervis asserted that if he were to reproduce the book, the 
majority of the text would remain unchanged, however, he would provide further insight into 
the role of emotions and motivated reasoning.53 In the context of the Anglo-German Arms 
Race, Jervis asserted that ‘British leaders had exaggerated the threat from Wilhelmine 
Germany and failed to see the extent to which their own behaviour in aligning with France 
and Russia had contributed to German insecurity’.54 Historian Richard Lebow described 
Jervis’ Misperception as an attempt at marrying up psychology and foreign policy.55 
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Moreover, Lebow asserted that Jervis’ literature provided valuable insights in to numerous 
foreign policy failures.  
 
The deterrence concept suggested that ‘great dangers arise if an aggressor believes that the 
status quo powers are weak in capability or resolve.’56 Although German naval policy is 
viewed by a variety of historians as aggressive, the theory that misperception, facilitated by 
the press, is still viable. The spiral model asserts that ‘arms procured to defend can usually 
be used for attack.’57 Therefore, it is entirely possible that press organs on both sides of the 
North Sea misperceived the foreign policy of the other. Moreover, ‘the drive for security will 
also produce aggressive actions if the state requires a very high sense of security of feels 
menaced by the very presence of other strong states.’58  Ergo, if Germany felt menaced by 
British sea power and Franco-Russian military power, it may have produced a deleterious 
effect on German foreign relations and led to an increase in naval production. One limitation 
of Jervis’ theory is that he fails to attribute any of the tension between Britain and Germany 
to the press. There is a lacuna in the literature concerning the press and its involvement in 
the Anglo-German antagonism, which will be addressed throughout the thesis.  
 
Contentious Debates Concerning the Dreadnought Era 
 
Debates over naval policy remain lively. Recent debates mainly derive from the ‘War in 
History Journal’ with regular critiques from historians. The main contributions to the current 
historiographical debate include Matthew Seligmann, Christopher Bell and Nicholas 
Lambert. The articles contain a debate between the revisionist and post-revisionist historians 
over the proposed naval ‘revolution’ that was due to take place in July 1914. Lambert 
suggested that the Admiralty were planning on reducing the number of capital ships in favour 
of submarines; a theory that the majority of historians decry. This forms the backbone of 
Lambert’s interpretation of the Dreadnought Era. Further topics include imperial defence and 
the evolution of the Royal Navy. Bell suggests that Lambert’s assumptions are unfounded, 
which provides the essence of the historiography.59  
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A critique of revisionist methodology concerned the ‘starting-point’ of their argument. Post-
revisionists stated that ascertaining Fisher’s views on future naval strategy and trying to 
assess Admiralty policy from it is insufficient. Historian David Egerton calls this ‘anti-history’, 
by trying to explain an event, which is unnecessary, because it never happened.60 
Therefore, Fisher had not induced a naval revolution but had built on pre-existing ideas and 
that there was transformative paradigm shift. Evolution also utilised a series of six articles 
used to provide the critique of the revisionist stance. One article deals with the relationship 
between Churchill and Fisher, and Fishers ‘supposed’ influence after his retirement in 1910. 
Seligmann asserted that Bell proves Churchill was his own man and made his own policies, 
regardless of Fisher’s influence. Seligmann critiques the revisionist works of Nicholas 
Lambert and Sumida and suggests that ‘British documents are consistently used in a 
selective fashion’.61 Evolution also suggested that the Admiralty had instead opted to use 
long-range gunnery over the revisionist suggestion of rapid fire at medium-range.62 
 
Christopher Bell argued that Admiralty plans between 1911-1914 were focused on the 
development of autonomous Dominion navies. Sentiment vs Strategy (hereafter Strategy) 
provides a post-revisionist account of the Dreadnought Era. The article focused on two 
separate but closely related themes, Imperial Defence and the navies of the Dominions. Bell 
suggests that Churchill planned that additional Dominion ships would allow the Royal Navy 
to focus its attention on the North Sea and meet the threat of Germany. If the Dominions 
could produce autonomous navies, it would also allow the Royal Navy to keep a presence in 
the Mediterranean. Christopher Bell provides a fresh interpretation of the Admiralty 
demonstrating that Churchill and the Admiralty had been planning for a war in the North Sea. 
Bell asserts that Churchill’s imperial plan failed and that by the eve of the war, the Dominions 
had not produced the desired fleets. Bell suggested that the historiography is dominated by 
the Anglo-German arms race and imperial defence is left under-researched. 
Strategy traced the challenges faced by the Admiralty apropos imperial defence. Strategy 
also provided a critique of Nicholas Lambert and Sumida. Bell accused Lambert of using 
unsubstantiated evidence concerning the deployment of battle ships to the Pacific in 1914. 
Bell asserts no such plan existed and that the Royal Navy was not on the verge of a 
‘revolution’ as argued by Nicholas Lambert. Bell produced a second work titled Sir John 
Fisher’s Naval Revolution Reconsidered (hereafter Reconsidered). Reconsidered introduces 
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secret plans to cancel the construction of two battle ships from the 1914-15 naval estimates 
in favour of flotilla craft. This would have meant Fisher’s revolutionary take on naval strategy 
had been adopted in the Admiralty under Churchill. Bell argues that this revisionist viewpoint 
is difficult to sustain, and that the Admiralty were far more conservative than Lambert 
predicts. Bell suggests that two critical errors made by revisionists. Firstly, that battleships 
and flotilla craft were inseparable. On the contrary, Churchill was planning on decoupling the 
two and utilising flotilla defence solely in the secondary theatre of war.63  Secondly, that the 
Admiralty had a single naval standard throughout the period. The only standard likely to be 
abandoned in 1914 was in the secondary theatre of war. Bell asserts that this does not 
signify a mistrust in battleships but a reaffirmation of the standard in the primary theatre of 
war, the North Sea. Moreover, the abandonment of the two-power standard in favour of a 
sixty per cent preponderance over Germany demonstrates that Russia and France were not 
the primary threats to Britain throughout the Dreadnought Era. 
Churchill believed a naval agreement with France was the only way of securing the 
Mediterranean. Britain would be able to secure French interests in the North Sea and 
Channel in return. Bell asserts that revisionist historians have failed to appreciate the true 
strategy of the Admiralty. The abandonment of the Mediterranean for flotilla craft only 
reaffirms the Admiralty’s faith in the battleship, especially to meet the German threat in the 
North Sea. Bell asserts that the submarine was not intended for the sole use as a tool of 
asymmetrical warfare, its actual purpose was to supply the main battle fleet with a decisive 
edge over its counterparts. Bell argues that Lambert’s sources regarding the naval 
‘revolution’ are contradictory and do not stand up to close scrutiny. Lambert’s assertion that 
the navy had cancelled two battleships of the 1914-15 estimates is therefore founded upon 
‘problematic evidence’. The argument concerned a piece of evidence suggesting that only 
two-gun mounts were ordered. However, Bell suggested that these were allocated for the 
‘accelerated’ battleships. Additional gun mounts were months away, due to the staggered 
nature of the building programme. 
 
Matthew Seligmann entered the historiographical debate viz. Royal Navy strategy and 
tactics in 2008. One of Seligmann’s seminal works is the aptly titled A Service Ready for 
War? The State of the Royal Navy in July 1914 (hereafter War). Seligmann attempted to fill a 
lacuna through a systematic analysis of documentation relating to a meeting due to be held 
in August 1914. Sumida claimed that the historiography of the arms race is heavily focused 
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on the threat Germany posed to British home waters.64 Seligmann suggested that there 
should be a greater focus on the threat posed to British lines of communication. Seligmann 
maintained that to reveal what the Admiralty were thinking and planning, it is necessary to 
examine the service on the eve of the First World War. War re-evaluates whether the Royal 
Navy was ready for the challenge of total war that loomed in 1914. Seligmann asserted that 
the documentation he relied upon ‘offers an excellent even unparalleled, perspective on the 
state of naval thought at the time’.65 Seligmann argued that although the Admiralty may have 
not had the answers to some of the challenges it faced, it had a remarkable degree of 
prescience.  
 
Seligmann began with an analysis of the preparedness of the Army in 1914, he then turns 
his attention to the Royal Navy. The senior service avoided the immense scrutiny the Army 
endured, due to the fact, Seligmann argued, that the navy was not embroiled in an attritional 
war.66 Seligmann then outlined the historiography of the Royal Navy’s pre-war experiences 
followed by the revisionist interpretation. Sumida believed that new evidence demonstrated 
the Admiralty was far more technologically minded than previously thought. Seligmann then 
addressed two historians, John Beeler and Iain Hamilton, who attempted to prove that the 
mid- Victorian Era navy was not in a state of stagnation. Seligmann discussed the ‘test 
mobilisation’ of the fleet which enabled all flag officers to be concentrated in home waters. In 
early 1914, Churchill called for a general meeting of all the Admirals and Commodores of the 
Home Squadrons. Although the meeting never convened due to escalating tensions in 
Europe, naval officers did submit planned topics for the meeting. This provided historians 
with a clear view of what concerned the Admiralty at this crucial point on the eve of the First 
World War. However, some of the concerns were omitted to keep the conference to a 
suitable length.  
 
Press Historiography  
 
It is now appropriate to provide a brief outline to the press historiography of the Dreadnought 
Era. One influential work was produced by A.J.A Morris in 1984, titled The Scaremongers: 
The Advocacy of War and Rearmament 1896-1914. Morris set out to research whether the 
British press intentionally portrayed Germany as a threat to further their own purposes. 
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Morris argued that the image of a Germany determined to achieve world hegemony was 
promoted by the press, journalists and editors to gratify their own intentions, namely the 
restoration of the Conservatives and benefit from financial gain. Morris noted the incestuous 
relationship between journalists, politicians and military officers as ‘they sought new 
techniques of persuasion appropriate to an age of emergent mass politics.’67 However, 
Frans Coetzee claimed that Morris’ conclusions were ‘inconclusive’ and did not answer the 
questions he posed in his preface.68 Moreover, the nature of press histories has changed 
considerably since 1984 and Morris did not include any aspect of IR theory. Therefore, a 
renewed attempt to research the role of the press in the decade preceding the First World 
War is necessary.  
 
The History of The Times was published in 1947 and comprised a series of three volumes. 
The epoch benefited from access to manuscript collections at Printing House Square. The 
first volumes outlined the repeal of the taxes on knowledge and outside competition. To 
combat the threat of competition The Times fixed its prices from 1861 to 1913 at 3d, which 
allowed the newspaper to maintain The Times as a ‘class paper wielding unique national 
influence.’69 The third volume, The Twentieth Century Test, was utilised for the thesis.  
Volume three described the acquisition of the paper by Lord Northcliffe and introduced the 
reader to some of the most revered journalists of the late Victorian Age, namely Valentine 
Chirol and George Saunders.70 One of the main methodological issues of the volumes 
concerns bias. The author failed to attribute any of the blame for the Anglo-German 
estrangement on to the journalists working at The Times, even though it is well documented 
that some publications published in the paper were inflammatory.71 Similarly to the work 
produced in the History of the Times, Alfred Gollin’s work on The Observer between 1908-
1914 identified the incestuous relationship between the press and politicians. Gollin 
highlighted the unique relationship between Admiral Fisher and the editor of The Observer 
J.L. Garvin. Gollin demonstrated that Fisher utilised Garvin to undermine the Liberal 
government he served under.72 Polemics in the British press will be discussed further in 
Chapter IV.  
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In the early 1980s, Stephen Koss produced The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in 
Britain.73 Koss set out to provide a chronological analysis of the relationship between 
politicians and the press. The literature suggested that even though a removal of taxes on 
knowledge allowed for greater freedom, political ties grew stronger throughout the late 
nineteenth century. One minor critique of Koss’ work is addressed by Joel Wiener, who 
stated that due to the chronological order of the literature, there were some ‘dull stretches as 
hundreds of minor journalists and scores of newspapers put in brief appearances only to be 
shunned off the stage in favour of star performers.’74 More recently, Mick Temple’s The 
British Press, traced the evolution of British newspapers from the English Civil War to 
modern empirical concerns. To build on the significant contribution of Koss, Temple and 
Morris it is necessary to explore an inter-disciplinary approach to the Dreadnought Era by 
incorporating press histories and IR theory.75 
 
German Foreign Policy  
 
There is a vast wealth of histories concerning German foreign policy throughout the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. One seminal work titled The Navy and German 
Power Politics 1862-1914 (hereafter Power Politics) was produced by Ivo Lambi in 1984. 
Power Politics was designed to provide context to German naval planning and foreign policy 
from pre-unification to the eve of the First World War. Of particular importance to the thesis 
are the chapters navigating the Anglo-German Arms Race. Chapter XI, titled Diplomatic 
Background to Naval Operations 1899-1904, is of specific interest. On numerous occasions 
Lambi suggested that German naval policy towards Britain was indecisive. This would 
suggest that German foreign policy towards Britain was not linear but in fact multi-faceted 
and appeared to vacillate in response to international events. Lambi discussed Holstein’s 
policy towards Britain. asserted that Holstein ‘sought improved relations and an eventual, 
truly reciprocal, alliance with her [Britain].’76 Lambi also addressed Germany perceptions of 
British policymakers. Lambi claimed that the traditional enemies of Germany laid within the 
Dual Alliance of France and Russia. ‘The diplomatic situation as perceived by German 
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leaders from 1899 to 1905 justified naval planning against Great Britain, the United States 
and Japan.’77 
 
Lambi suggested that German naval planning towards Britain was indecisive and the 
German hierarchy differed in opinion. If this was true, then a case for misperception can be 
argued. Moreover, the term ‘operational planning’ does not necessarily denote aggression. A 
great power needs to be prepared for different eventualities. For example, the United States 
had drawn up war plans envisaged against all the major powers throughout the era. The US 
war plan against Britain was titled ‘war plan red’ but had no real interest in such a disastrous 
war. Lambi tackled the issue of German war planning throughout Power Politics. Of 
particular interest is the second line of the reserve fleet which would be utilised in the latter 
stages of a war against Britain in the eventuality that the main fleet had been defeated or 
severely weakened. A Reichstag Budget Committee memorandum concluded that the 
second line would provide ‘the only security that we would have in case of war against 
England.’78 What is telling about the memorandum is the terminology. Arguably, the term 
‘security’ is not the language of a power that is intent on solely aggressive actions.  
 
On the notion of German armaments and naval planning, historian Berghahn suggested that 
even if one accepts that there was no aggression in the German fleet construction, Britain 
would perceive it as a naval confrontation.79 Berghahn also asserted that the draft naval 
plans of 1903 would conceal the true might of the German fleet. It is evident from the 
evidence provided by Lambi that German naval policy was not necessarily aggressive. 
Moreover, Lambi’s theory supports the notion of misperception as the draft of 1903 would 
conceal the true number of the German fleet facilitating one of the key components of the 
spiral model, deception. By April 17th, 1912, the Kaiser stated that he wished no naval 
agitation between Britain and Germany, moreover, did not regard Britain as Germany’s main 
naval rival and sought an agreement based on neutrality and colonial understandings.80 This 
point demonstrates that German naval policy was not wholly hostile towards Britain.  
 
An Improbable War? edited by Holger Afflerbach and David Stevenson is composed of 
series of essays. One key chapter by Michael Epkenhans, titled Was a Peaceful Outcome 
Thinkable? The Naval Race before 1914. Three key questions are pondered by Epkenhans 
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concerning the source of both Britain and Germany’s naval ambitions, the naval arms race 
and the steps taken to alleviate the race. Epkenhans discussed the potential of a pre-
emptive strike against Germany by the Royal Navy.81 A case can be made that German 
naval policy may have been reactive to such threats. Certain British newspapers and 
politicians called for a pre-emptive strike on Germany, sparking an emergency in some 
German coastal regions. Arguably, some of the blame has to be attributed to the naval policy 
of Britain. Epkenhans suggested that both Nicholas Lambert and Jon Sumida viewed 
Germany’s naval build as only a minor consideration.82 To become a true global player, 
Germany looked towards Britain as the leading example, noting Britain’s naval strength as 
the catalyst of its empire building. Furthermore, Epkenhans described the notion of German 
succession from Britain as the colonial powerhouse. The idea that Germany would succeed 
Britain in a linear fashion.83 Moreover, the axiom that fervent Anglophobia in Germany was 
'universally present’ did not necessarily translate into an aggressive naval policy.  
Baron Marschall von Bieberstein ‘declared that Germany could not carry out her economic 
policy without possessing a power at sea which could protect us against the necessity of 
yielding to England at every turn.’84 Epkenhans clearly outlined the disputes amongst the 
German hierarchy apropos German naval policy. Some factions inside the Imperial Navy 
were conscious of a British ‘Copenhagen-style’ attack, supporting the notion that German 
foreign policy was not linear.  The 1909-1910 British naval budget included the building of 
eight capital ships. Epkenhans suggested that there is evidence that the information 
received by the Admiralty concerning the building rate of the German fleet was exaggerated. 
Moreover, Epkenhans suggested that there is evidence that the Admiralty had been 
generous when calculating Germany’s building capability and had ‘thus misled both the 
public and Parliament.’85  
 
Epkenhans asserted that the 1909 Naval Scare highlighted the danger of false publications 
and their repercussions. Moreover, according to Epkenhans, Theobald von Bethmann-
Hollweg foresaw that the planned Novelle of 1912 had the ability to cause irritation in Anglo-
German relations and consequently ‘tried to prevent the introduction of the Novelle as best 
he could.’86 This demonstrates that states actors were aware of the deleterious effect naval 
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policy could exert over foreign relations. The heightened sense of British naval security, due 
to the disparity between British and German naval construction a thawing in relations.87 
What is evident from the historiography of German naval policy is that it is multifaceted and 
did not pursue one policy of aggression.  
 
One theory outlined how domestic policies were the driving force behind German naval 
expansion. Tirpitz believed that without a strong navy or sea presence Germany would be 
relegated to a pre-industrial farming country.88 A strong German navy would secure the 
economic future of the country. This theory ties in with the Luxury Fleet by Holger Herwig. 
Herwig aimed to provide the reader with a general overview of the recent historiography 
pertaining to the German naval build up at the turn of the twentieth century. Tirpitz never 
intended to attack the British fleets and that he relied heavily upon the notion of the ‘risk 
fleet’. Herwig noted that Tirpitz designed the German fleet with Britain in mind. However, he 
also attributed the German naval bills with domestic pressure. Au fond, the naval contracts 
handed out to German manufacturers would stifle the attempts of the social democrats and 
liberals to increase the power of the Reichstag.89 Moreover, Wilhelm II would also view the 
naval bills to his own personal advantage as the Imperial German Navy would provide a 
force ‘relatively independent of parliamentary control.’90 This suggests that German naval 
building was designed with a domestic purpose in mind.  
 
*** 
The secondary literature has provided the thesis with a sound contextual knowledge. As 
stated in the introduction, it is not the intention of this thesis to enter the current 
historiographical debate concerning the revisionist and post-revisionist dispute. However, it 
is hoped the thesis will contribute positively to the general historiography of the Dreadnought 
Era. It is evident from the literature review that Marder provided ample context apropos the 
press throughout the era, however, Marder failed to link these events to foreign policy or 
attribute it to the Anglo-German estrangement. Moreover, Sumida acknowledged that a 
debate concerning HMS Dreadnought raged in the public sphere, but again failed to link this 
back to IR theory or foreign policy. It is clear that there is a lacuna in the historiography of 
the Dreadnought Era. What follows is a chronological account of events that plagued Anglo-
German relations in the Dreadnought Era incorporating IR theory and press history. 
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Chapter II. The Anglo - German Press 
 
‘If only we could have a perfect press, we might look for a perfect world’91 
 
The Anglo-German arms race was a cycle of misperceptions aggravated by the press. As 
noted by Joseph Maiolo, ‘armed rivalry between political communities is ancient, but arms 
races are much more recent’.92 In November 1906, whilst defending Germany’s foreign 
policy in the Reichstag, Prince Bülow stated that there were no deep political divisions 
between Germany and Britain.93 Bülow insisted that in many instances, for example in the 
arts and science, both countries were closely aligned. ‘There have been misunderstandings 
between the two nations, unpractical and unreasonable misunderstandings, for which both 
sides are equally to blame’.94 Attempts to secure British naval dominance coupled with 
Germany’s pursuit of empire facilitated an unintentional misperception compounded by the 
press. Even without denying Germany’s role in the arms race, the press magnified divisions 
between the two countries. 
The chapter introduces some key concepts including notions of political psychology from 
Robert Jervis’ Misperception. Political psychology studies the ‘attitudes and behaviours of 
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people toward things that are of relatively little concern to them’.95 Jervis suggested that 
political events and voting are ‘peripheral’ to people’s lives. Therefore, when dealing with 
journalists and politicians in the Dreadnought Era, it is important to remember that they were 
dealing with potential life and death situations, for their own personal careers and those of 
the people they serve. Politicians were also striving to maintain domestic support over 
foreign affairs. It is hard to judge a state’s foreign policy without investigating its perception 
of its environment. It is also wise to take a step back and study the psychology of Germany’s 
leaders: Did they believe Germany was secure or menaced by Britain?  How do politicians 
draw inferences from what is presented to them, especially if that information is contradictory 
to their own views?  
The objective of this chapter is to demonstrate how press polemics in Britain and Germany 
facilitated an Anglo-German misperception. The chapter incorporates the IR theory of 
‘misperception’ and comprises a range of sources from Foreign Office, CID and Cabinet 
Office papers. The thesis utilises extracts of official reports from British naval attaché 
Captain Dumas (RN) and Lieutenant Colonel Gleichen to British Foreign Secretary Frank 
Lascelles. Dumas asserted in his report that the British press had published a ‘great mass of 
rubbish which has lately appeared in the English papers and magazines as regards 
invasion’.96 It is evident from these reports that  fears of a German invasion, which gripped 
Britain, were full of folly. Lest anyone fail to understand the importance of Dumas’ report in 
dismantling the press.  
The chapter will also demonstrate the negative impact amateur diplomats, chiefly journalists. 
Furthermore, the thesis will also explore the issue of inflammatory press publications in 
Britain and Germany from 1900 to 1914, which ultimately led to an Anglo-German 
misperception. ‘The problem is that forming an accurate perception of the other is very 
difficult because the other’s behaviour is usually ambiguous and deception is an ever-
present possibility’.97 Proprietors of newspapers stood to make a significant financial gain 
from an outbreak of war. How did personal feelings and prospects of financial gain distort the 
publications of newspapers and ideologies? Moreover, it is evident that relatively small and 
seemingly insignificant events could also perpetuate the idea of Anglo-German 
misperception which could endanger European peace. The chapter will finish with a case 
study of the Second Boer War to demonstrate the ability of the press to distort foreign policy. 
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*** 
For the historian to grasp the era, it is worth noting the principal newspapers in circulation 
throughout Germany and Britain. This enables the historian to ascertain the nature of Anglo-
German press relations and domestic situations. The basis of press history is formed from 
the seminal works of Stephen Koss on the British press. Koss’ The Rise and Fall of the 
Political Press in Britain and Mick Temple’s The British Press provide ample material 
pertaining to the Dreadnought Era. It is evident from the research that the Imperial 
Government were inept at controlling polemics in the German press, especially when their 
broadsides were directed towards Britain.  
Towards the end of the nineteenth century a wave of ‘new journalism’ swept across Britain, 
which included new editing, presentation and selection. This phenomenon was orchestrated 
by a Victorian middle class who were hungry for information concerning the world they lived 
in.98 A removal of ‘taxes on knowledge’ led to cheaper newspapers and an increase in 
literacy. A flurry of new newspapers emerged at the turn of the twentieth century, these new 
papers had the advantage of incorporating technological developments whilst avoiding the 
increased running costs of production.99 The wave of ‘new journalism’ led to an era of press 
barons, notably Alfred Harmsworth (Lord Northcliffe) who led a revolution in the printed 
press. The price of advertisements and high running costs led to a closed newspaper 
marketplace which led to smaller, less influential papers to close down. 
‘New journalism’ refers to the new style of journalism and newspapers that emerged post 
1855 in Britain.100 The term was coined by Matthew Arnold in 1887 whilst describing the 
work of W. T. Stead at Pall Mall. According to Arnold, the new wave of journalism was ‘‘full of 
ability, novelty, variety, sensation, sympathy and generous instincts’ but with one serious 
flaw – it was feather-brained.’’101 Temple asserted that at the turn of the twentieth century ‘a 
new generation of national newspapers was created, and local daily papers were 
established in all Britain’s major towns’.102 The British press enjoyed an enviable reputation 
which outmatched its continental and Atlantic models with ‘a notable vitality, and, not least, 
an unmatched political authority’.103 
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Due to high running costs and advances in technology many ‘radical’ newspapers by the 
turn of the century had either disappeared or integrated into the mainstream British press. 
The radical presses also struggled due to many of them failing to appeal to wider audiences 
and failing to fulfil the needs of commercial advertising. It is worth noting that throughout the 
latter stages of the Victorian Era, a new readership sprang up from the lower middle classes 
and industrial bourgeoisie. According to Koss ‘competition in the press steadily intensified, 
production cost soared, and the market – once considered illimitable – now seemed to have 
been saturated’.104  
Dreadnought Era press outlets are defined by capitalist press barons and commercialism. 
Press barons such as Alfred Harmsworth had a disproportionate influence over political and 
public spheres. Prominent journalist, W.T. Stead, categorised the popular newspapers of 
1904 into four categories descending in importance. According to Stead, The Times and 
Westminster Gazette were top tier newspapers and those ranked lowest included The Sun 
and the Daily Mirror.105  
‘The influence of the press upon the decision of cabinets is much greater than that wielded 
by the House of Commons’.106 Stead’s words rang true and garnered swift adjustments 
inside the world of politics. Politicians who were reliant on their performances inside the 
house and on family connections were becoming increasingly aware that their positions were 
under public scrutiny and more significantly, vulnerable from attacks in the press. The 
relationship between the press and politics at the turn of the century was intrinsically linked, 
with numerous politicians writing columns or becoming proprietors of newspapers. By the 
year 1910, up to thirty sitting members of Parliament were newspaper proprietors.107  The 
principal British newspapers in 1910, according to the Audit Bureau of Circulation, include 
the new-wave newspapers of The Daily Mail (1896), The Daily Mirror (1903) and The Daily 
Sketch (1909). The established papers Manchester Guardian (1821), The Daily Telegraph 
(1855) and The Times (1785) still enjoyed extensive readerships in Britain. It is of note that 
certain newspapers were often formally tied to a political party, usually on a financial basis, 
thus the press was clearly not an impartial nor a neutral force.  
One methodological consideration concerns bias within the documents. For example, the 
Foreign Office received translations of German publications which offers its own 
methodological and ethical issues. Who was responsible for selecting the pieces to be 
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translated? Were the translations competent? Those reporting back to the Foreign Office 
may omit certain documents or translations for their own agenda. Therefore, some of the 
resources may be taken cum grano salis. Moreover, ‘the press on the continent is 
susceptible of a much larger measure of government influence and control’.108 Reginald 
Tower’s report was written in a period when numerous influential parliamentarians owned 
and controlled mainstream newspapers in Britain.109 Throughout the nineteenth century 
journalists and papers alike were openly partisan and supported party lines. At the turn of 
the twentieth century there was a shift towards ‘straight news reporting’ although many 
papers still aligned themselves with political parties who also financially backed them. As the 
franchise grew, it became imperative for the press to appeal to the ‘common man’.110 
Alfred Harmsworth was the proprietor of the Daily Mirror and Mail. Northcliffe changed the 
face of British journalism forever when the arrival of the Daily Mail in 1896 sparked the wave 
of new journalism ushering in a new era of commercial and entrepreneurial enterprise. The 
Daily Mail was an immediate success. Although it had a relatively small circulation in 
comparison with well-established papers, it largely appealed to the growing lower middle 
classes. Northcliffe had managed to create a cheap and lively newspaper which captured 
the imagination of the British public.111 Public opinion could arguably then be utilised and 
swayed by newspaper proprietors like Northcliffe. Moreover, the advent of ‘new journalism’ 
coupled with the advancements in suffrage altered the political landscape in Britain.  
*** 
German newspaper circulation is harder to ascertain as The Times correspondent George 
Saunders suggested that it varied considerably 
and is not necessarily in proportion to the importance of the paper, 
especially as the system of quoting other papers prevails so extensively in 
the German press that an important article published originally in a paper 
that is little read may attain the widest publicity.112 
The principal German newspapers in circulation throughout Berlin included the ‘Official 
Gazette’ of the Imperial Government the Deutscher Reichsanzeiger und Preußischer 
Staatsanzeiger. The Deutscher Reichsanzeiger, published once a day, featured a formal and 
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informal section. The former filling the first few pages with new laws and decrees, the latter 
filled with general news, described by Saunders as somewhat tardy.113 Other principal 
government newspapers in Berlin covered imperial news. For instance, the Deutscher 
Kolonialblatt, not to be confused with the non-governmental Deutsche Kolonialzeitung, was 
known to be critical of the German colonial policy. The Deutscher Kolonialblatt was edited by 
the Colonial Department of the Imperial Foreign Office. The two main contributors and 
editors of the Imperial Press Department were Dr Hammann and Herr Esterneaux.114 
The arrival of Reuters news agency in 1851 reformed the way newspapers reported the 
news. The wire service was pioneering, utilising new technology available to report on news 
stories from around the world. The telegram and advent of transatlantic cables facilitated an 
increase in news reaching Europe from the Americas. Research conducted on German 
newspapers from 1865 to 1906 reported events in the previous 24 hours increased from 11 
to 95 percent of a daily newspapers’ content’.115 According to Temple, it is likely that British 
newspapers would have experienced a similar increase. Outside of Berlin, the provincial 
newspaper Kölnische Zeitung was the prominent and highly popular choice, which was not 
limited to Rheinprovinz.116 The Kölnische Zeitung was a tri-daily newspaper with a glowing 
reputation as a well-written and edited paper. Ideologically liberal, the newspaper had been 
utilised by the Imperial Government as a semi-official communique. The relationship 
between papers, journalists and government was incestuous. Freidrich von Holstein, head of 
the political department of the German Foreign Office, had a close confidant in the editor, 
Justizrat Fischer. The Kölnische Zeitung enjoyed a circulation of circa 200,000.117 Outside of 
Rhenish Prussia, the radical Frankfurter Zeitung, in the region of Regierungsbezirk Frankfurt, 
was the paper’s closest competition. 
Regionally, Reginald Tower, a British diplomat, reported to Edward Grey in 1906 that the 
Bavarian newspapers were lacking in literacy discipline and that ‘there is no single paper 
which can be regarded as reaching a high literacy standard’.118 Tower, also questioned the 
wider literacy standard and discipline found in national newspapers throughout Germany. In 
a further report to Grey, Tower suspected that ‘perhaps this may be said generally of the 
press in the German Empire, and it is certain that Bavaria does not produce the best, even 
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of German papers.’119 The prominent newspaper in the Bavarian region was the Allgemeine 
Zeitung. The chief editor was Dr Martin Mohr. Mohr frequently visited Berlin, from Munich, 
where he was regularly received by the Chancellor and Prince Bülow. The newspaper 
received a government subvention of 22,000 marks per annum.120 Due to the subvention 
received from the Imperial Government, the newspaper was naturally imperialistic in its 
nature and generally supported imperial policy. Conversely, the Neue Nachrichten [see 
appendix 2] which received no such funding, was openly hostile towards Britain and critical 
of the Imperial Government foreign policy. The polemics were mainly driven by the editorial 
comments emanating from prominent diplomat and Orientalist, Dr Johannes Heinrich 
Mordtmann.121 
Conservative newspapers in Germany enjoyed extensive circulations. The Neue 
Preussische Zeitung was popular amongst landowners and military classes.122 It generally 
supported government policy and was religiously orientated towards protestants. The foreign 
affairs editor, Dr Schiemann, enjoyed royal and official favour. The Nottingham Evening Post 
described Schiemann as the ‘foremost exponent of German imperialism’.123 The politics of 
Schiemann will be discussed in greater detail throughout the paper. Other newspapers of 
note were the ‘semi-official’ Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung [appendix 3] who supposedly 
received no funding from the government but closely toed the government line. One other 
prominent newspaper was the independent Berliner Lokal- Anzeiger, which had the largest 
circulation in Berlin, ca. 300,000 and claimed to be non- political. Saunders stated their aim 
was to publish general news in a non-partisan paper.124  
The self-proclaimed ‘central organ’ of the Social Democratic Party of Germany’, Vorwärts, 
had a circulation of ca. 93,000 in 1906.125 Saunders claimed that Vorwärts had a small 
number of papers in circulation due to its intended working-class audience.126 
Unsurprisingly, Vorwärts was vehemently opposed to government policy and hostile towards 
the upper and middle classes.  
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*** 
At the turn of the century there were numerous war scares in both Britain and Germany, a 
period which witnessed the blossoming of a relationship between Admiral Fisher and the 
journalist W.T. Stead. Stead was one of the pioneers of modern investigative journalism, 
who viewed the role of the journalist as central to social change.127 Stead was also 
instrumental in crossheadings, illustrations and raising public attention to social issues such 
as child prostitution. There is also evidence of Fisher passing carefully selected and 
classified information on to close confidants in the press.128 This phenomenon is mentioned 
in Marder’s Anatomy although not in the context of ‘misperception’. Prominent journalists 
and correspondents such as Valentine Chirol and George Saunders who worked at The 
Times as Foreign Affairs Correspondent and Berlin Correspondent respectively. Saunders 
au courant with German politics and public opinion, provides context to Anglo-German 
relations up to 1902. The 1900 Naval Scare, sparked by renewed French naval efforts, 
shook the Admiralty into a period of ‘revolution’ at the hands of Admiral Fisher, who earnt his 
nickname ‘radical Jack’. Fisher took radical steps to procure equipment, scrap obsolete 
vessels and prepare the Royal Navy for an engagement with Germany. Fisher assumed the 
role of First Sea Lord upon his return to Whitehall on October 21st, 1904.129  
In April 1904, Britain signed an entente with France, the Entente Cordiale. The congenial 
relations that developed alleviated the pressure on Britain, ending decades of fierce naval 
competition. Coupled with the Japanese Alliance, which was signed two years prior, it 
allowed for security in the Far East. By 1906, Britain was in a strengthened position owing to 
the defeat of Russian naval forces by the Japanese Navy at Tsushima. The Russo-
Japanese War eliminated the Russian threat to Britain signified by the Anglo-Russian 
Convention in August 1907. Britain’s primary threat was now the Imperial Navy, implied by 
Admiral Fisher’s policy of redistributing the Royal Navy’s assets to the North Sea.  
A publication in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung stated that the Anglo-German 
estrangement was a ‘mental disease’ and hoped that Britain would come around to the 
German way of life.130 The article concludes by asserting that in ‘concert’ with almost the 
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majority of the German press ‘the organ of the Wilhelmstrasse absolutely ignores the 
important part which certain leading papers in this country have played in bringing about the 
deplorable estrangement whose days, it is hoped, are past’.131 Public opinion could prove 
hazardous to government foreign policy ‘the fact that public opinion was seen as either 
uneducated or, worse, partially educated, and liable to be swayed by untrammelled 
sentimentalities or gripped by untameable passions.’132 Politicians and civil servants alike 
were all too aware of how the press could be utilised for personal gain. British newspapers 
fuelled hostility against Germany, ‘against such jingoistic propaganda, opposition to the war 
was commercial suicide for newspapers’.133 The financial aspects of war were of the upmost 
importance for press barons and their newspapers. Emerging from the nineteenth century, 
the press developed into a powerful and influential tool and gained a notoriety for being 
named as the ‘fourth estate’ of the realm. By the end of the century the press had developed 
and  
was firmly established at the centre of British political life and yet despite 
the clear economic and ideological ties to ruling class interests and often 
directly to political parties – still managed to represent itself as being 
above the fray, an independent arbiter of the struggles it observed134 
 
Lord Northcliffe noted that the power of the press was relentless, every ‘extension of the 
franchise renders more powerful the newspaper and less powerful the politician’.135 
Throughout the Boer War, 1899-1902, sales of the Daily Mail peaked at a million sales a day 
demonstrating that ‘war is always a boom time for the media’.136 Moreover, the press 
provided crucial information to individuals on both sides of the North Sea. The sagacious 
German naval officer, Admiral Buchsel, gained an intimate knowledge of the perpetual 
increase in British naval estimates and redistribution of the fleet. In conversation with naval 
attaché, Commander Dumas, Buchsel revealed he gained the majority of the information 
from ‘The Times, The Naval & Military Record and the Western Daily Record’.137 A disparity 
between the Anglo-German arms race and US-Soviet relations throughout the Cold War 
concerns open source intelligence. Soviet and US officials were not able to accurately 
perceive what technologies the other side possessed. Conversely, throughout the 
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Dreadnought Era, British and German officials were able to draw conclusions through the 
press and naval attaché reports.  
 
Temple described the relationship between politicians and journalists in the early twentieth 
century has been as ‘incestuous’.138 The British press was utilised by politicians and 
influential figures as a vessel for vested political interest and both political and press spheres 
were described ‘to all intents and purposes as concentric’.139 The foreign policy of the 
Kolnicshce Zeitung was heavily influenced by an intimate confidant of Holstein, Justizrat 
Fischer striking similarities between Fisher and his close confidants.140  
*** 
A small group of men on both sides of the North Sea shaped Anglo-German foreign policy. 
By studying the correspondence between these men and the publications in the press, it will 
highlight the division and deception which led to an Anglo-German misperception. To 
summarise ‘the spiral model holds that statesmen see hostility as indicating that the other is 
out to get them and believe that the best, if not the only way to cope with this threat is with 
negative sanctions.’141 A case study of Anglo-German misperception compounded by the 
press is evident throughout the Second Boer War. 
Between 1899 and 1902, British Armed Forces were involved in a conflict throughout South 
Africa known as the Second Boer War. The conflict straddled the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries and provides the first example of Anglo-German misperceptions. There had been 
previous agitation between the British and German press in the form of the Kruger Telegram 
in 1896. Stephanus Kruger, leader of the Boer forces, was congratulated by the Kaiser for 
repelling six hundred British soldiers in the Jameson Raid. The telegram highlighted the 
enmity of German society towards Britain. In context of IR theory, the telegram was 
designed to agitate the British as part of a more hostile position taken by Germany to entice 
Britain into closer relations. The plan backfired dramatically as polemics against Germany 
filled the British press. Germany believed that Britain was in a ‘weak’ position, facing a war in 
South Africa whilst maintaining a dominant naval force. Germany sought to exploit this by 
acting as an ‘aggressor’ in an attempt to coax Britain closer to the Triple Alliance. The Times 
reported in 1908 that the telegram ‘is now known beyond dispute to have been the 
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Emperor’s own doing’.142 The original telegram was drafted by the Kaiser and was toned 
down by his anxious political advisors.  
The case study traces the root causes of Anglo-German agitations in the Dreadnought Era, 
introducing two key journalists, Valentine Chirol and George Saunders.143 Both were 
influential journalists, active throughout the Boer War, who provided numerous articles on 
foreign affairs and Anglo-German relations. British journalists attracted attention in Berlin at 
the turn of the century, Bülow remarked that Saunders produced derogatory articles towards 
Germany, ‘twice or three times a week he collects bitter criticisms of England and sends 
them to London omitting to say that they always come from agrarian and other trouble 
making papers’.144 The research begins with Anglo-German relations at the turn of the 
twentieth century with the Boer War and visit of the Kaiser to Britain in November 1899. The 
visit attracted attention in the German press and also highlighted the differing opinions of 
The Times journalists, Chirol and Saunders. Chirol’s views on German foreign policy began 
to align with those of his colleague with the announcement of the second German naval bill a 
mere three weeks after the visit of the Kaiser. Bülow’s infamous ‘hammer and the anvil’ 
speech began to stoke Teutophobia in Britain. One strand of British foreign policy sought an 
‘understanding’ with Germany which, they argued, would facilitate a shoring up of British 
security in the Persian Gulf and Far East. Informal and unofficial attempts were made to this 
effect, however the Imperial Government were not interested in an ‘informal’ understanding 
and pursued a formal alliance, by acting aggressively towards Britain.145 In a speech to the 
Reichstag, Prince Bülow addressed German press attitudes towards Britain throughout the 
Boer War. Bülow attributed the hostility in the press to German romanticism and idealism 
‘that at that time it was not hatred against England which raised so much enthusiasm for the 
Boers, for even at that time such hatred did not exist’.146 Moreover, the Chancellor wanted to 
‘restrain irresponsible scribblers in the press who did an infinity of mischief’.147 It is evident 
that the temerity of the German press caused concern amongst German officials. However, 
the sentiments of the Chancellor were undermined as conversations were held between 
Russia, France and Germany over a possible intervention in South Africa. German officials 
were keen to exploit the situation in South Africa and suggested a multilateral agreement to 
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increase co-operation. The Germans were rebuked partially due to pressure exerted on 
Nicholas II to solve the war in South Africa peacefully, after calling for the First Hague Peace 
Conference. 148 
Press polemics forged a state of enmity between the German public and the British state. 
George Saunders viewed the Anglophobia in the German press as emanations of the 
government. However, it is evident from German correspondence between the Foreign 
Secretary and Bülow that the ‘government were pulling hard against the current of 
opinion’.149 Anglophobia was entrenched in German society and nurtured by German press 
organs and journalists. Arguably, in the event of an Anglo-French conflict, the German press 
would form a tertius gaudens by exploiting the delicate situation and coaxing Britain into an 
alliance. Throughout the Boer War, the ‘German nationalist press were naturally the more 
Anglophobe, while the government strove to maintain an attitude that was correct and 
neutral’.150 The reviling Anglophobic nature of the pan-German press was laid out on a tapis 
and digested by the German public.  
 
One aspect of the Boer War concerned publications outlining British ‘atrocities’ in the 
German press. The articles severely hampered Anglo-German relations throughout the 
period. Interestingly, an article published in The Times in 1908, claimed the Anglophobia 
witnessed in the German press during the Boer War could have been ‘simply’ resolved.151 
The article suggested the Emperor had received reports from German military attaches in 
South Africa claiming the British were behaving honourably. ‘Had they been published at the 
time, calumny would have been silenced; but the Emperor who could have ordered 
publication, did not order it’.152 It is evident that the Imperial government fuelled 
misperception by withholding key information from the public. The polemics in the German 
press caused a misperception of British foreign policy in Germany, in turn the British viewed 
the Germans as wholly hostile. The Northern Review and Advertiser reported that ‘in 
Germany, the organised system of press lying set in motion at the outbreak of the war by Dr 
Leyds and his friends, completely blinded the mass of people to the steady progress we 
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were making’.153 The same article charged the Germans with prolonging the Boer War and 
suggested that the Kruger telegram was the catalyst.  
 
Examples of invective pouring from the pan-German press throughout the Boer War are 
plentiful. According to Foreign Office reports, publications often used provocative language 
such as ‘Gottverfluchte Englanderei’ (God-damned English) and proclaimed the Boer 
population as ‘volksgenossen’ (people of the German nation). These polemics provide an 
example of the press perpetuating the misperception of Anglo-German relations at a time 
when Britain was looking to Germany as a potential ally. The report in The Times citing 
German government sources exclaimed that ‘this tendentious method of reporting made it 
very difficult for us to keep up the good relations with England which were desired on many 
sides’ ergo creating an impression of Anglo-German misperception.154  The German 
government were all too aware of misperceptions suggesting that ‘agitation to incite British 
public opinion to take counter-measures would be disastrous’.155 Bülow blamed the 
correspondence of Saunders for creating obstacles and hindering progress in Anglo-German 
relations. Moreover, Bülow claimed that Saunders omitted the source of his evidence and 
only used ’trouble-making papers i.e. those that hate their own government more than 
England’.156  
 
Valentine Chirol, foreign affairs editor at The Times, found the Anglophobia in the pan-
German press to be lacking real sincerity and instead believed that Russian policies posed 
the greatest threat to Great Britain.157 This view may have been influenced by Chirol’s 
travels in the Far East. Moreover, other journalists did not hold Saunders’s belief that 
Germany was the bête noire.  British publications were furnished with pro-German 
sentiments and were sanguine in the face of the worsening situation in the Transvaal. 
Britain’s solitary position in world affairs at the turn of the twentieth century stoked the 
German press into producing further scathing attacks on British foreign policy. Saunders 
believed that the only way the Kaiser could pass a larger naval budget through the 
Reichstag would be by increasing ‘anti-British agitation’ in Germany ‘as the necessary 
means of inflaming patriotic emotion’.158 It is evident that Saunders was using virulent anti-
                                                            
153 ‘Mr Black’. Forres Elgin and Nairn Gazette, Northern Review and Advertiser. Moray, Scotland. 
Wednesday 11 June 1902. p.2 
154 The History of the Times. Vol. 3. (1947). London. The Twentieth Century Test 1884 -1912 p.305 
155 Ibid. 304 
156 Bülow to Hatzfeldt. The History of the Times. Vol. 3. (1947). London. The Twentieth Century Test 
1884 -1912. p.305   
157 The History of the Times. Vol. 3. (1947). London. The Twentieth Century Test 1884 -1912 p.304 
158 Ibid. p.299 
38 | P a g e  
 
Germanism as a tocsin of German naval ambition and highlights the opposing views of 
journalists.  
 
Besides conflicting views on threat perception, the Boer War was also synonymous with 
scandal. In January 1900, a scandal arose in the British Foreign Office, which would strain 
Anglo-German relations. Valentine Chirol at The Times under information obtained through 
Cecil Spring-Rice, a close confidant of the American Secretary of State John Hay, informed 
Chirol of Germany’s aim for US intervention in South African war. Chirol wrote to the Foreign 
Office offering ‘authentic information’ on the German Embassy in Washington applying 
pressure to the President to intervene.159 The Secretary of State claimed that Germany was 
working towards the isolation of Britain, undoing the work of previous years, which had 
witnessed improving Anglo-US relations. The incident altered Chirol’s view on Germany, 
having previously believed that Russia were still the greatest threat to Britain. Chirol wrote to 
Saunders exclaiming that ‘I am afraid there is no longer any room to doubt the profound 
hostility and duplicity of Germany’.160 It transpired that the Imperial Foreign Office made 
overtures to American journalists to promote Germany and the Emperor in the American 
press. However, it was later decided by German officials that America had limited diplomatic 
clout.161 Public scandals are addressed further in Chapter IV.  
*** 
By 1906, the Anglo-German arms race began to strain diplomatic relations. British officials 
began to wonder where it had all gone wrong and looked toward the Boer War as the 
catalyst. In a report to Edward Grey, Reginald Tower described the hostility of the German 
press throughout the Boer War. Moreover, the report described a sudden change from 
hostility to grand gestures of friendship in the press. Tower suggested this shift was due to 
the control which ‘appears to be effected by the press bureau at Berlin accommodated as it 
is in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’.162 This suggests that some form of control was exerted 
over the hostile press of Germany. The polemics issued by the German press throughout the 
Boer War had strained Anglo-German relations. German politicians and officials were 
anxious about the potential agitation caused by the press. The report demonstrates the 
power of the government over the press. Herr Hamann, Secretary of Legation, oversaw the 
correspondents of the country’s newspapers. Newspapers had to pass information through 
him to be vetted. Hamann was also responsible for keeping the newspapers ‘in line’ 
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according to Tower.163 Tower’s report to Grey stresses that the task is ‘to provide the 
correspondents with such information as the government may wish published and to 
remonstrate, gently though efficaciously in case of opposition or contumacy’.164     
 
Saunders served as Berlin correspondent for The Times from 1897 to 1900. Throughout his 
posting he published numerous articles warning the British public of German hostility, before 
it was common knowledge.165 The Imperial Government were aware of the damage The 
Times correspondent could inflict on Anglo-German relations. Saunders caused such a stir 
that official representatives from Germany approached the British asking for Saunders to be 
removed from his position. Interestingly, Saunders had been a protégé of stalwart journalist 
W.T Stead at Pall Mall. It was Stead who pushed Saunders towards the world of 
journalism.166   
Several government documents were sent from Germany to Britain concerning the 
perception of international events portrayed in the German press. It is noted in numerous 
documents that the Royal Navy were usually the envy of the German public and press, 
evoking jealousy.167 The documents also highlight how anti-German sentiments in The 
Times were expressed throughout publications. At the turn of the twentieth century the 
German government were all too aware of how the pan-German press could prove to be an 
obstacle in Anglo-German relations and actively sought to stem any polemics. However, Sir 
Fairfax Cartwright, a British author and diplomat, suggested that the German government 
failed to pass on semi-official statements to avoid anti-British comments to the press. 
Cartwright also stresses that ‘the smallest incident which in any way affects Great Britain’s 
position in the world at once gives rise to comments and criticisms in the German press, 
generally of a character unfriendly to ourselves’.168  The sentiment of the letter reflects the 
hostile nature of the German press towards Britain, Cartwright asserted that this is usually 
due to envy and jealously. It is evident that Mr Cartwright au courant with German public 
opinion and press attitude towards Britain. Marder’s Anatomy mentions German press 
keeping Anglophobia alive due to their belief the British press were holding grudges.169 
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Cartwright was appointed to Vienna after his tenure in Berlin. He was later embroiled in a 
newspaper scandal and was relieved of his position in 1913.170  
British politicians and Foreign Office officials attempting to trace the origins of the Anglo-
German estrangement could pinpoint the polemics printed in German newspapers as the 
spark. The documents demonstrate that the German public and government were influenced 
directly by publications in British newspapers throughout the Second Boer War. German 
officials could have put an end to the polemics with ease. German officials withheld vital 
information from the public apropos British ‘atrocities’ in South Africa. Had they published the 
military attaché reports stating the British were acting honourably, the rumours could have 
been put to bed. The research also demonstrated the differing opinions of journalists, 
namely Chirol and Saunders at The Times. Saunder’s warned his colleague of Germany’s 
naval ambitions and drew criticism from Bülow and the Kaiser over his publications. 
Chapter III. The Dreadnought & Deteriorating Relations  
 
 
 
‘It is not always easy for a man to trace the inward path and steps by which he reaches his 
own conclusions, so much of the working of the mind is subconscious rather than conscious. 
It is difficult to be sure of one’s own mind, one can only guess at the processes in the minds 
of others’171 
 
 
Addressing the Reichstag in 1906, Prince Bülow asserted that ‘there is certainly an 
economic competition and rivalry between Germany and England. Such competition need 
however raise no political differences not to speak of inflaming a war’.172 Bülow argued that 
Britain had close economic rivalries with the United States and Japan which had not led to 
agitation. Similarly, Germany’s relationship with Italy and Austria-Hungary were not affected 
by similar economic competition. The spiral model indicates that both Britain and Germany 
were worried by the threat of a mutual-first strike capability and a reciprocal fear of a surprise 
attack.173 This forms the basis of what Jervis terms as ‘spiral dynamics’.174 The objective of 
the chapter is not to provide a chronological account of the Anglo-German arms race, but 
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instead outline press relations from 1905 to 1912. This will be done by highlighting salient 
events throughout the defined era and demonstrating that the press played a vital role in the 
deterioration of Anglo-German relations. Moreover, the chapter introduces principal 
characters such as John Francis Charles who served as Berlin chargé d'affaires from 1906 
to 1911.175 The private correspondence between Edward Grey and Charles provide a crucial 
insight into Anglo-German relations. Charles held numerous meetings with the likes of the 
Prince Bülow and often entertained the Kaiser.  
 
The Anglo-German arms race of 1897 to 1914 underpinned the feeling of mistrust and 
anxiety that plagued Anglo-German relations in the early twentieth century. Edward Grey 
stated that ‘great armaments’ will always lead to war, ‘while one nation arms, other nations 
cannot tempt it to aggression by remaining defenceless’.176 Although German politicians 
stressed on numerous occasions that the German navy bills were not designed to challenge 
British naval prowess, there were feelings of mistrust and consternation in British society. 
Bülow stressed that ‘our [Germany’s] building programme, which is fixed by law, is 
exclusively regulated by our requirements of self-protection’.177 Bülow’s statement must be 
taken cum grano salis, as it is clear that the Germans did pose a serious and credible threat 
to Britain. Numerous politicians and German journalists decried any rumours or headlines of 
aggressive German naval ambition. However, certain German press organs issued oblique 
attacks on the British. In a tête-à-tête between Prince Bülow and William Goschen, it was 
revealed that some in the Imperial Government wished to silence the polemics in the 
press.178 Thus there was awareness that the press increased misperceptions.  
 
Meanwhile in early twentieth century Britain, the German naval menace had become the 
idée fixe in the British mind. The Hampshire Telegraph reported in mid-1908 that Lord Esher 
claimed British naval supremacy had ended with the advent of German naval power; ‘so 
rapid has been the acquisition of naval strength by Germany and so formidable are her fleets 
in being, that she has forced upon England a concentration which has thrown the control of 
the Pacific into other hands’.179 The comments in the British press did not go unnoticed in 
Germany. The Kaiser complained bitterly to Lascelles about criticisms of Germany in the 
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British press in early 1908. He argued that British articles were full of pejoratives towards 
Germany.180 Lascelles enjoyed a close relationship with the Kaiser but resigned his post as 
British Ambassador to Germany in 1908 as he disliked the policies of Bülow. Lascelles, 
succeeded by Goschen, continued to exert influence over Anglo-German relations post-
resignation as a éminence grise.181  
 
*** 
British naval prowess had been gathering pace throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. The Bank of England was created in 1694 to facilitate parliamentary borrowing 
and spending, a structure that other European competitors lacked.182 By 1805 Britain had 
acquired the largest naval force in the world after defeating the combined Franco-Spanish 
fleets at Trafalgar. Towards the 1880s, Britain witnessed a resurgence in the Marine 
Nationale which provided a prelude to the aforementioned Fashoda Incident, pitching the 
two foremost imperial powers against one another.183 The French withdrew from the Sudan 
as a consequence of British naval power, leading to a thawing in relations.184 Coupled with 
the Russian defeat at the hands of the Japanese in 1905, Germany was now firmly Britain’s 
primary naval competitor.  
 
The term ‘Dreadnought Era’ is defined by the revolutionary ship, HMS Dreadnought. 
Following the success of the Japanese Navy in the Russo-Japanese War, the Admiralty 
turned its attention to an ‘all-big-gun’ warship. The Dreadnought had firmly captured Fisher’s 
imagination.185 HMS Dreadnought was five hundred and twenty-seven feet of sleek 
cemented armour, painted in Admiralty Grey. With a uniform armament, propelled by two 
sets of steam turbine engines, HMS Dreadnought revolutionised naval construction. Fisher 
championed the idea of speed and all-big-gun ships.186 The decision to pursue an all-big-gun 
ship was a controversial policy in the Admiralty as some believed it would level the playing 
field and eliminate the British numerical advantage. However, the Dreadnought had the 
benefit of paralysing foreign competitors and gave the Royal Navy an advantage over their 
German rivals. 
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Aside from the commissioning of HMS Dreadnought, the era was defined by other reforms 
enacted by Fisher. One key reform was the nucleus crew system. Implemented by Fisher, 
he dubbed the nucleus crew system the greatest improvement of modern times.187 Under 
the reforms, vessels in the Reserve Fleet would be complimented with 2/5 of a full crew. If 
the ship was deployed, a full crew would join the original compliment. This would allow for 
the skeleton crew to keep the ship fighting fit and maintained, with the added benefit of being 
able to rapidly deploy when called upon. One cause celebre was the scrapping of obsolete 
vessels under the reforms. All ships commissioned prior to 1887 and ships slower than 23kts 
were scrapped.188  
In Bülow’s 1906 speech to the Reichstag, he addressed the issue of German naval 
armaments. Bülow questioned why Germany should be scolded for building up a fleet similar 
to that of Britain’s competitors. France, Italy, Japan and America had all acquired similar 
fleets. Bülow also suggested that Germany’s path was one of peace, citing that Germany 
had not been at war with any of the great powers since the establishment of the German 
Empire and that any war would not be initiated by Germany, ‘it is clear from our attitude 
during thirty-five years that Germany pursues an eminently peaceful policy’.189  
 
The Emperor believed that the British press were blaming Germany as the source of the 
naval agitation and expansion.190 On a subsequent occasion, the Emperor ‘pointed out that 
the misconceptions and mis-statements of the British press constituted a distinct menace to 
the relations between Germany and Britain’.191 According to the annual report of 1908, a 
concerned Kaiser sent a letter to the First Lord of the Admiralty, Edward Marjoribanks, who 
reassured him of Britain’s friendly intentions and provided Britain’s annual naval budget 
which was to be presented to parliament.192 The friendly exchange demonstrates that 
officials on both sides of the North Sea were working towards an ‘understanding’ and that 
the press were causing an agitation and misperception of foreign policy. The primary 
concern of the Kaiser was that the German public would read the inflammatory British press 
articles and conclude that Britain regarded Germany as an enemy. This in turn would lead to 
public pressure on the Imperial Government to increase naval expenditure, an outcome the 
Kaiser could not accept. William Goschen described these events as ‘fatal’ in Anglo-German 
                                                            
187 Ibid, p.37 
188 Marder, A. (1940). The Anatomy of British Sea Power; a history of British Naval Policy in the pre-
Dreadnought Era, 1880-1905. 1st ed. New York: A.A. Knopf 
189 Extract from the November 1906 ‘Speech to the Reichstag’. Prince Bülow. Count de Salis to Sir 
Edward Grey. 19th November 1906. FO 371/80/126 
190 Sir Edward Goschen to Sir Edward Grey. Annual Report 1908. 7th August 1909. FO 881/9518/2 
191 Ibid. FO881/9518/2 
192 Ibid. FO 881/9518/5 Edward Marjoribanks’ peerage title was Baron Tweedmouth. 
44 | P a g e  
 
relations.193 Moreover, Goschen noted in 1908 that ‘with the presses of the two countries 
arguing the question and railing at each other, it was not to be expected that there would be 
an increase in the good will felt on either side’.194  
 
There was a belief in Britain that German officials were using commercial expansion as a 
guise, enabling Germany to build up a fleet that could one day pose a risk to Britain. British 
Army officer, Lt. Col. Gleichen, believed that  
under the cloak of purely commercial expansion, an aggressive imperial 
policy is not unknown. Rumours appear in the press, which at once are 
emphatically denied, only to be brought forward after a short lapse of time 
with further evidence of their reality 195  
Prince Bülow stressed to Goschen that he had made attempts in the Reichstag to ‘make it 
clear that both he and the Imperial Government as a whole were sincerely desirous to make 
Anglo-German relations as friendly as possible’.196 Bülow suggested that the British and 
German press exacerbated the issue through their use of ‘injudicious language held by 
members of the German Navy League (Flottenverein) and reproduced with emphasis by the 
press of both countries’.197 It is evident from the correspondence between Bülow and 
Goschen that the press contributed to misperception. 
 
According to Foreign Office documents, on several occasions, Herr von Bülow stated that he 
wished the froideur would dissipate between Britain and Germany and assured Goschen 
that his successor would do everything within his power to foster an Anglo-German 
‘understanding’.198 Bülow’s successor, Baron Schoen, expressed similar sentiments. 
Although he deplored the hostility of the English press, he understood why the British took 
umbrage with German remarks. Schoen made especially disparaging remarks on the Navy 
League calling it an ‘evil spirit’, while ‘meetings of fire- eaters, at which the word ‘invasion’ 
was far too freely used, bellicose articles in the press and long-winded essays from warlike 
professors “did the rest”.199 Schoen then reported that he realised the cost of the German 
Dreadnought programme had caused a great deal of concern with the British public and 
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stressed that not all those who were passing through the Reichstag were in favour of 
Germany building the ships.200 
 
Schoen asserted in private correspondence that by 1909 the German ‘people were sick of 
the troubles in which their naval expenditure involved them, and that the one wish of the 
Imperial Government was to allow for good relations with England and settle the naval 
agitation’.201 Schoen’s claims coincided with the agitation caused by the Blatchford Report in 
The Times and further polemics in the British press. In a conversation between the new 
Chancellor and the Emperor, the Emperor claimed that he was never happier than when he 
was on English soil and that he was very fond of the English people. ‘I am always held up as 
a monster of duplicity, and the English people are taught to believe that I harbour warlike 
designs against them’.202 This provides a further example of how the press may have 
aggravated a misperception, in this instance against the Emperor by inciting unfounded fear.   
 
Prince Bülow was forced to defend German naval policy on numerous occasions following 
scathing attacks in German socialist newspapers. The socialist press attributed British naval 
expansion to the threat posed by the German naval bills, supporting the notion of the spiral 
model.203 This theory was refuted by Bülow, ‘how often have I stated that the idea that the 
enlargement of the German fleet is directed against England is nothing else but foolish’.204 
This demonstrates a misperception in Anglo-German relations and that Bülow’s public 
statements were not always credible. According to the 1909 Foreign Office report, German 
financial affairs dominated proceedings inside the Reichstag for the first six months of 
1909.205 Yet 1909 was the year of the ‘naval scare’ stoked by H.H. Mulliner which increased 
British naval production, supporting the argument of Keith Wilson that the Foreign Office and 
government created a German threat.206 If attentions on state finances dominated 
proceedings, did the pan-Germanic press produce hyperbolic publications to facilitate an 
agitation with Britain?   
 
Arguably spurred on by potential financial gain, Harmsworth and the editors of the Daily Mail 
produced ‘fictional serials and often fanciful news stories that stoked up the German menace 
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and many critics saw Harmsworth and the Daily Mail as major contributors to a climate of 
opinion in which war with Germany began to appear inevitable’.207 In recent years, the 
historiography has turned sour against Harmsworth. He was described as wielding ‘power 
without responsibility’ by the former Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin.208 The press were 
largely pro-war and anti-German, when war seemed inevitable papers which were not 
previously pro-war lost readership. As the wave of patriotism swept over the country, the 
potential of financial gain for the pro-war papers became ever apparent as circulation 
increased. Temple suggests that ‘next to the Kaiser, Lord Northcliffe has done more than 
any other living man to bring about war’.209  
 
Ernest Cassel, a British merchant and close confidant of King Edward VII, visited Berlin in 
1909 to discuss the possibility of an Anglo-German ‘understanding’.210 Cassel’s visit came 
against the backdrop of the inflammatory Blatchford Report in The Times, which will be 
addressed in Chapter IV. Aside from the hostile pan-German tabloids, Cassel’s visit was 
warmly received by the German press. However, it was generally accepted in the German 
press that an ‘understanding’ with Britain could only occur if the German naval programme 
was not deviated from. Towards the end of 1909, rumours to circulate that Germany was to 
come to a naval understanding with Britain.211 The terms of the agreement were rumoured to 
include several crippling stipulations including a suggestion that Germany had agreed not to 
complete her naval programme. The fabrication was quickly thwarted by the German 
Government, citing that the headlines would lead to a misbelief in Britain that Germany 
would entertain the idea of altering the naval programme.212 Moreover, Bülow claimed that it 
was a necessity for Germany not to deviate from the programme citing the need to protect 
German commerce and overseas possessions. He then insisted that ‘we [Germany] don’t 
intend to build a fleet as strong as the British, but we have the right and the duty to maintain 
a fleet corresponding to the proportion of our trade’.213  
 
According to the annual Foreign Office report of 1909, Prince Bülow utilised his close 
relationship with the editor of the Frankfurter Zeitung to quickly dispel any rumours apropos 
German naval aggression; ‘anyone who understands the conditions and trend of our policy 
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must realise that the renunciation of our ship building programme is quite out of the 
question’.214 The false rumours published in the German press had clearly irritated the 
Imperial Government. The Frankfurter Zeitung article also contained comments on the 
meeting of the Kaiser and King Edward VII who had apparently approached the Kaiser about 
a potential ‘understanding’, but the Kaiser had rejected any advances on curbing the 
German naval programme. William Goschen reported that by 1908 the 
naval question has got out of hand and now so dominates and colours 
every other question that no good can be found to exist in the nation whom 
Germans have so long been taught to regard as wishing to place every 
obstacle in the way of the development of their power at sea.215 
It was hoped that the meeting between the two monarchs would have a restorative effect on 
Anglo-German relations. However, in a report to Edward Grey at the Foreign Office, Count 
de Salis produced translations of hostile press publications in German press organs. The 
Tägliche Rundschau and the Hamburger Nachrichten published a series of polemics 
directed at Britain.216 The articles were written by a German Naval officer and vehement 
nationalist, Ernst Graf zu Reventlow. The articles published in the papers were openly 
hostile towards Britain, one being titled ‘The English Menace’.217 Reventlow continued ‘we 
have grown accustomed to being regarded as Germania est Delenda*’.218 Count de Salis 
noted that these articles would ‘expound that great change in public opinion’ which Salis 
noted had increased in hostility and anxiety against Britain in the nine months since his 
arrival in Berlin.219  
Reventlow claimed that the British press and politicians ‘failed’ to name the ‘enemy’ in their 
publications, but stressed that anyone with a map and a knowledge of British naval stations 
can easily deduce that Germany is the ‘enemy’.220 There were further claims that the British 
naval stations in Gibraltar and Malta were becoming superfluous whereas Rosyth, Dover 
and Portland were to become the new centres of British naval activity. Moreover, Reventlow 
labelled the Anglo-French naval redistribution as ‘aggressive’. He reasoned that if a foreign 
power stationed soldiers along another country’s borders it would be considered an 
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‘unfriendly act’.221 Moreover, the vessels floating in the North Sea posed a military threat due 
to their mobility and fire power over conventional soldiers, ‘therefore any movement of this 
sort is, in a sense, of still greater military and political importance’.222 Reventlow produced 
further articles directed at Britain. ‘Two years ago the English press recognised the then 
reorganisation or shifting of the centre of power to the North Sea, as directed against 
Germany, but the Admiralty gave it also simply and drily as a motive’.223 Reventlow also 
claimed that he was ‘sure’ there was an Anglo-French military convention aimed at 
Germany. He also stated that the French were redistributing their two fleets to home 
waters.224 It is interesting to note that the press and the Admiralty took different lines viz. the 
redistribution of the fleet. If the Admiralty wished to avoid German agitation, the press did not 
receive the memo.  
In stark contrast with the affable nature of Bülow’s speech in the Reichstag, numerous 
venomous articles were published in Germany. Prince Bülow called for ‘the establishment of 
friendly and confidential relations between England and Germany’ but it would ‘require time 
and patience, for behind us lives a long period of misunderstandings’.225 The article also 
reported on a speech made by an Admiralty official wherein he stated that from that time 
forward ‘the fleet would be able, and in a position to strike the first blow, and that it would 
appear on the enemy’s coast before the press of that country had even published hostilities 
had broken out’. 226 Moreover, the publication claimed that the press wielded their power to 
procure an increase in naval armaments. The inflammatory articles in the German press 
facilitated misperceptions of German foreign policy. Reventlow then suggested that German 
officials were warned not to arm energetically to deter the British as it may irritate them.227 
Reventlow warned the readers of the publication against the ‘deception’ published in English 
Conservative press organs, ‘bona or mala fide, give out that the new organisation means a 
reduction of the English fighting force. Just the opposite is the case.’228 It is evident from the 
language employed by Bülow that he was aware of the power wielded by the press. The 
damage inflicted by polemics led him to state that he hoped ‘journalists of both countries 
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have learnt to know one another not only as men but also as gentlemen, and that, with all 
patriotism of their future polemics, hatred and mala fides will be avoided.’229  
Between 1909 and 1911 the deeply divided Liberal Party found itself in a perilous position. In 
early 1909, Churchill (Board of Trade) and Lloyd George (Chancellor of the Exchequer) were 
strongly opposed to the idea of a German naval menace. Agitation stirred by the press and 
public pressure heaped hardship upon the already burdend Liberal Government. Instead of 
the four ships proposed by Churchill and George, McKenna pushed for six, and some 
polticians advised eight. Britain built eight Dreadnoughts much to the disappointment of the 
liberal-minded Scott. Supporting the spiral model of misperception, aggrevated by the press, 
resulted in Britain building a much larger number of Dreadnoughts than needed.230 Such 
dissonance and discord infected the Liberal Party. During the 1909 Dreadnought saga, 
Reginald McKenna had threatened resignation on nuermous occasions.231 The 1909 
Dreadnought ‘scare’ will be discussed further in Chapter IV.  
In 1906 there was a major redistribution of the fleet under Admiral Fisher concentrating the 
majority of the Royal Navy in the North Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. However, by 1912, 
British naval officials weighed up the German naval threat and reconsidered its position 
adding woe to the perilous position of the Liberal Party. One of the crucial phases of 
Churchill’s tenure as First Lord concerned Mediterranean policy. The construction of 
Dreadnoughts by Austria-Hungary and Italy altered the security environment, making it 
difficult for Britain to match capital ship fleets in two seas. On numerous occasions Churchill 
suggested that only flotilla craft should be operated in the Mediterranean as a solution. The 
idea that Britain should abandon the ‘Latin Lake’, harming the countries prestige and proving 
the wider issue of imperial defence was a cause celebre. There were also questions as to 
whether the dominions should provide warships for their own defence, which would allow the 
Royal Navy to free up its assets to face Germany.  
The Admiralty were presented with three options to match the German naval ambitions. 
Firstly, to enter a binding alliance with France which would shore up and alleviate naval 
pressure on the Channel and Mediterranean Squadrons. Secondly, increase the naval 
budget, which as addressed, was against the policy of the Liberal Government or thirdly, do 
nothing and wait. The debates in Parliament would cause hyperbole in the British press 
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stoking nationalist fires. The politico-naval storm attack on Churchill by Lloyd George in the 
press over the naval budget increased tensions further. The security dilemma retained its 
importance, as Britain sought to shore up its security, it had the adverse effect on Germany. 
Churchill hung his hopes on the promises of the Canadian Prime Minister. Churchill believed 
that ‘with the help of our children beyond the seas we trust we shall yet maintain unshaken 
our old place upon the waters’.232 The Canadian Prime Minister, Robert Borden, promised 
Churchill that the Canadians would provide a number of Dreadnoughts that would be at 
Britain’s disposal in a time of need. However, the bill failed to pass through the Canadian 
Senate due to the high expenditure.233 After further deliberation, backed up by the press and 
public pressure, it was decided that Britain would maintain a ‘one-power standard’ in the 
Mediterranean. The fleet would be kept at Malta while the Atlantic fleet would be stationed at 
Gibraltar, able to steam towards either the North Sea or Mediterranean at will. The 
repercussions of the expenditure saga demonstrated the relationship between the press and 
imperial defence. The press pursued the British government into maintaining a naval force in 
the Mediterranean demonstrating the power and influence of the press. Captain Faber, MP 
for West Hants, spoke at a public event in November 1912 claiming that abandoning the 
Mediterranean was a dangerous idea. The Scotsman reported that within six months of the 
proposed reduction, eight ships of the Mediterranean Fleet were steaming towards 
Constantinople to save European lives, ‘that alone would justify our having a fleet in the 
Mediterranean’.234 
*** 
Charles Scott sat as a Member of Parliament for Manchester North East and was 
subsequently re-elected to the seat of Leigh (Greater Manchester) in 1900, despite his 
opposition towards the Boer War. By 1911, Scott had been editing the Manchester Guardian 
for nearly forty years and became the proprietor from 1907 to 1932. The Guardian was 
unapologetically catered for the liberal left of society, espousing the cause for female 
suffrage and a pacific foreign policy. Throughout the Boer War, the stance of the newspaper 
became pro-Boer and anti-imperialist. Scott had many personal connections including 
Winston Churchill, Reginald McKenna and Lloyd George. Scott’s career epitomises the 
intrinsic relationship between the press and politics.   
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Scott left Parliament after the landslide Liberal election victory of January 1906, at a point 
when many of his close confidants and former colleagues had won prominent positions on 
the Government benches and had naturally hoped to gain his journalistic support. When 
Scott visited London after relinquishing his seat, he sought knowledge of Government 
policies and where he may be able to influence their course.235  Scott was under the 
impression in 1912 that Germany had been trying to befriend Britain for at least three years 
and that she had rebuked at every turn.236 The Political Diary of C.P. Scott highlights how 
Scott was predominantly on the side of Lloyd George viz. the Liberal feud with H.H Asquith.  
By March 1905, French imperial ambitions in West Africa paved the way to the First 
Moroccan Crisis. The Kaiser visited Morocco proposing a defensive pact with the Sultan and 
pushed for a conference to secure Moroccan independence. French foreign secretary, 
Delcasse, refused a conference leading to increased tensions. Under the terms of the 1904 
Entente with France, Britain was inclined to support the French in Morocco. The Algeciras 
Conference was convened to resolve the situation and the Germans eventually backed 
down.237 In April 1911, the French deployed a vast army to the interior of Morocco to 
complete their partial take over. Germany responded by sending a gunboat, the SS Panther, 
to the Moroccan coast and demanded compensation in the way of territorial gains in the 
Congo sparking the Agadir Crisis. The Agadir Crisis was a casus foederis that had the 
potential to escalate into a full-blown European war. Under the Entente, Britain was under 
obligation to support French imperial ambitions in Morocco. Marder noted that Admiralty 
documents suggested that Britain would intervene in the event of a German attack on the 
French.238 
The Moroccan Crisis provided a further attempt for Germany to estrange Britain from 
France. The spiral model suggests that German actions throughout the crisis had the 
undesired effect of pushing France and Britain closer together.239 This theory also explains 
German attempts to estrange Britain and the United States, a relationship which the 
Americans were previously dubious about. There was a belief in Germany that economic 
competition might lead to Anglo-American hostility. The Moroccan Crisis drew similarities 
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with the 1898 American-Spanish War, where Germany sent a fleet to Manila to impress their 
American counterparts, the results were counterproductive as the Americans viewed the 
German actions as hostile.240 Consequently, the Americans viewed the British naval 
squadron in the region as a necessity. German gun-boat diplomacy clearly failed throughout 
the Dreadnought Era.  
The Agadir Crisis threw a spotlight on German naval ambition. If Germany controlled the 
coast of Morocco, it could endanger Britain’s main trade routes to India and the Far East. 
This proved to be a red line for the nationalist British press and the Navy League which 
viewed the ‘Latin lake’ as a traditional sphere of British influence. The Navy League stressed 
that Germany could not be afforded a naval base in the vicinity of any British interests. In a 
Foreign Office report on the Spanish press, it was stated that throughout the Russo-
Japanese War the Russian Government had tried to influence the Spanish press in their 
favour. It is interesting to note that during the First Moroccan Crisis ‘it does not appear, at the 
present moment, either Germany or France are using the Spanish press for political 
purposes.’241 Due to the geographic nature of Spain, it is surprising neither Germany or 
France actively sought to influence their journalists.  
Interestingly, in 1906 an article appeared in the February edition of the now defunct National 
Review titled ‘Ignotus’. The article claimed it had ‘proof’ Germany were the aggressors in the 
First Moroccan Crisis by stating that in Spring 1905, ‘the Emperor delivered three war like 
speeches’.242 The Review also claimed the Emperor was doing everything in his power to 
avoid an Anglo-French rapprochement and break up the ‘Entente Cordiale’.243 The German 
press reacted angrily to these claims, with the Norddeutsche Zeitung labelling the claims 
‘grotesque’.244 Frank Lascelles noted that the claims in the National Review were false and 
that, in fact, the speeches made by the Emperor were in the Spring of 1904, a full year 
before the Moroccan Crisis.  
The agitation in the press caused by the aforementioned article in the National Review 
contradicted the pleasant nature of meetings held between officials. A meeting took place 
between Commander Philip Dumas and the German Emperor, in which the Emperor was 
pleasant and cordial, wished Dumas a pleasant stay in Berlin and that he would remain on 
friendly terms with his German counterparts.245 It is interesting to note that the Liberal press 
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organs in Britain were not suspicious of German policy in Morocco, ‘it is generally 
recognised that her [Germany] policy of the open-door in Morocco has even been of material 
service to us and that there would be any deadly danger to our interests in her acquiring a 
West African port would be wholly disbelieved’.246 Charles Scott even goes as far as 
believing a German naval base on the coast of Morocco would alleviate pressure on the 
British naval budget which paved the way for less money to be spent on Dreadnoughts to 
combat the threat.247  
*** 
In June 1909, the Manchester Courier reported that Krupp were increasing their production 
of gun-mounts and suggested that the government were covering up when the intelligence 
was received. ‘In spite of all the efforts of Ministers to conceal the real state of naval affairs, 
the truth is gradually being disclosed’.248 Moreover, the Londonderry Sentinel reported in 
December 1911 that the Germans were pushing to accelerate their naval programme, 
without furnishing their report with any evidence.249 The article stated that Britain should 
respond accordingly by accelerating its own programme. This is just one minor example of 
inflammatory articles published in the British press. Further inflammatory articles alluding to 
Britain’s naval position are prevalent throughout the Dreadnought Era. Schiemann’s article, 
reprinted in the Nottingham Evening Post asserts that ‘it is not difficult to believe that the 
ultimate objective of British policy is a Continental war, which would run parallel to a 
projected attack against the German navy’.250 It is evident from the language of the 
publications that the German naval threat affected the entirety of Britain, geographic location 
did not prevent fear trickling through the press.  
An extract from The Times dated January 1st, 1906, stated that ‘from Brazil to Japan, from 
Madeira to Kaio-Chan there was not a corner of the globe where German intervention had 
not made the Germans appear to be less the promoters than the obstructers of humanity’.251 
Whilst there was no want for war in the Liberal cabinet, nor amongst its officials, the 
nationalist and radial newspapers caused a stir in Britain. Scott noted, ‘I can imagine no 
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more foolish war and none more fatal alike to party and to national interests than one with 
Germany on this matter’.252 These extracts demonstrate the contrast between the liberal and 
nationalist press. 
The Royal Navy were faced with asymmetrical force structures throughout the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. French naval policy throughout the nineteenth 
century leaned towards industrial warfare. A Guerre de course revolved around the 
strangulation of British commercial interests. German war plans included a proposal to adopt 
a ‘risk fleet’, in which Germany would build up a large enough fleet to act as a deterrent. If 
Britain were to engage the Imperial Navy, it would severely weaken the Royal Navy and 
leave Britain open to attack from a tertius gaudens.  Chillingly in 1908, Fisher predicted that 
a war with Germany would occur in October 1914, this is when the Kiel Canal widening was 
due for completion. Fisher’s thoughts were reciprocated by cabinet meetings in 1912.  
 
*** 
The chapter highlights the cycles of misperception that plagued Anglo-German relations 
throughout the Dreadnought Era. Journalist and politician, Charles Scott, exemplifies the 
connections between politics, foreign policy and the press. The personal diplomacy between 
the two monarchs of Britain and Germany, although cordial, was strained extensively by the 
press. Moreover, it is well documented that Bülow utilised his personal connections in the 
press to dispel any rumours of German naval aggression. Bülow used his speeches in the 
Reichstag to denounce any agitation with Britain but consequently faced scathing attacks in 
socialist and pan-Germanic publications. It is evident that the role of the press was 
instrumental in the deterioration of Anglo-German relations throughout the Dreadnought Era. 
However, for the historian to understand the roots of German hostility towards Britain, war 
scares, spy mania and scandal in the press needs to be addressed. 
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Chapter IV. War Scares, Spy Mania & Public Scandal  
 
‘Germania est delenda’253 
 
The issue of ‘home defence’ had plagued the War Office (WO) since the 1890s.254 The initial 
fear concerned the threat of a potential Franco-Russian invasion in the late nineteenth 
century. The Franco-Russian threat was superseded by the perception of hostile German 
foreign policy and a potential invasion of the British Isles. Agitation caused by the ‘invasion 
bogey’ paved the way for establishment of the British Expeditionary Force and redistribution 
of the fleet. Tensions heightened between 1899 and 1902 when Britain found itself facing 
multiple threats. The Boer War in South Africa combined with the defence of India led to a 
fear that Britain was becoming overstretched militarily.255 Growing imperial concerns led to a 
rift between the hierarchies of the Royal Navy and the Army on how to cope with the issue of 
home defence. The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that the press wilfully disregarded 
the truth apropos invasion fears and fabricated tales of spies operating in Britain.  
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Throughout 1909 and 1910 the fear of invasion was exacerbated by the press which 
published sensationalist articles concerning German spies operating in Britain. This 
misperception of German foreign policy led to a public frenzy. The British press were 
prognosticating a German invasion with little or no evidence. As ‘spy mania’ gripped Britain, 
Teutophobia gripped the press. Commander Philip Dumas (RN), naval attaché to Germany, 
Belgium and the Netherlands wrote a series of reports from the 9th February 1906 to 1st 
August 1908, aimed at providing a detailed analysis of German naval preparation and ability. 
Dumas asserted in 1908 that ‘public opinion in Germany is always, to my mind, wholly 
adverse to war and wherever it could exert any influence would certainly make for peace’.256 
If Dumas’ assumption was correct, why did the British press whip up agitation? It is clear 
misperception played a crucial role in Anglo-German relations.  
Previous war scares in Britain had amounted to nothing. Notable examples include the 
French war scare in 1900. Navalists in Britain were suspicious of French naval ambitions 
and believed an invasion might be possible.257 Rumours that the Reserve Fleet has been put 
on standby combined with hostile publications in the French nationalist press exacerbated 
the issue. Images of a sanguinary campaign against the French caused mass hysteria. 
However, it was common knowledge in the Admiralty that the French were underprepared 
for a naval campaign against Britain and by the winter, the invasion scare fizzled out.258  
The question of home defence had paralysed British policy making since the mid-nineteenth 
century. Palmerston’s Follies were a series of fortifications installed in the English Channel 
and coastal areas to protect Britain from a possible French invasion. The fortifications were 
vastly over budget and by the time they were completed the threat had subsided with the 
conclusion of the Franco-Prussian War. In early twentieth century Britain, there were two 
main schools of thought on naval matters. The “blue water” school and the “bolt-from-the-
blue school”.259 The policies of the two schools will be discussed throughout the chapter. 
The rising threat of Germany and of invasion reignited the debate concerning home defence. 
There was a strong belief in Britain that the German naval trajectory would enable them to 
become a first-class naval power by 1906, second only to the Royal Navy.260  
*** 
                                                            
256 Commander Philip Dumas to Sir Frank Lascelles. 13th February 1908. CAB 17/61/7 
257 Marder, A. (1940). The Anatomy of British Sea Power; a history of British Naval Policy in the pre-
Dreadnought Era, 1880-1905. 1st ed. New York: A.A. Knopf. p.65 
258Marder, A. (1940). The Anatomy of British Sea Power; a history of British Naval Policy in the pre-
Dreadnought Era, 1880-1905. 1st ed. New York: A.A. Knopf. p.380 
259 Ibid. p.380 see chapter XVII for further context on the matter.  
260 Marder, A. (2013). From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow. 1st ed. Anapolis [Maryland]: Naval 
Institute Press. p.102 
57 | P a g e  
 
Throughout the winter of 1908-1909, deviating from the opinions Admiralty experts, reports 
surfaced that Germany were increasing their naval programme.261 The reasoning behind the 
rumours pointed to increased nickel purchases to construct naval turrets. Further rumours 
suggested that Germany would be producing an increased number of ships, which would 
threaten the two-power standard.  The reports led to public anxiety followed closely by a war 
scare. Polemics in the British press came against the backdrop of the Second Bosnian 
Crisis. The Kilburn Times reported that in an event of a German attack ‘food supplies would 
be stopped, and the country starved’.262 However in Goschen’s annual report of 1909, he 
highlighted an article in the Vossische Zeitung which claimed that only a small number of 
military and naval officers had contemplated the idea of invading Britain. The contradictory 
nature of the reports is commonplace in the Dreadnought Era. Public agitation was 
exacerbated by reports flooding in from Germany of increased production of Dreadnoughts 
and gunnery efficiency. Moreover, throughout the saga the Daily Mail claimed that Britain 
was forsaking her naval supremacy for old-age pensions.263 Throughout the Dreadnought 
Era, Lord Northcliffe, proprietor of the Daily Mail, introduced a system of serials, usually 
100,000 words in length. The introductory publication would usually be ca. 5,000 words, then 
broken into 1,500 word per day. In 1906, a publication titled the ‘Invasion of 1910’ was 
released in the Daily Mail.264 The serials were written by novelist William Le Queux and the 
publication sanctioned by Northcliffe personally. The serial depicted in great detail an 
invasion of Britain one year in the future. Arguably, Lord Northcliffe would profit from 
increased newspaper sales in the event of a war. Moreover, the invasion literature was 
provocative and against the backdrop of invasion fears, irresponsible. The publications had 
an electrifying effect on British public imagination.  
The Liberal Party faced a grave dilemma throughout the Dreadnought Era, balancing social 
reform against the ever-increasing defence budget. The government performed this 
balancing act whilst facing mounting pressure from the conservative press and the Navy 
League. Moreover, reports surfaced that German manufacturer Krupp could produce gun 
mounts three times quicker than their British counterparts, sparking angst in the Royal 
Navy.265 Britain only faced one real competitor, but one that could increasingly compete on 
equal terms. Consequently, the Dreadnought Era saw an aberration from the two-power 
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standard.266 A discussion was held apropos a policy of laying two keels for every one laid by 
Germany.267 Alternatively, Britain could maintain a preponderance of sixty per cent over 
Germany. During a naval debate in the House of Commons in March 1909, a third option 
was suggested by Edward Grey, by diffusing the arms race, through attaining mutual attaché 
reports between Britain and Germany. However, Germany were not interested in this 
proposal.268  
Sensationalist reports in the British press stirred up anxiety, the Warwick and Warwickshire 
Advertiser stated that ‘reports had also been circulated that German officers regularly drank 
a loving cup to “the day of reckoning with England”’.269 The same article also reported that 
during naval budget debates in the Reichstag that ‘German naval administrators had divided 
England into districts under the supervision of an officer’.270 The threat of German invasion 
was not limited to southern England, as demonstrated in an article published in the Dundee 
Courier. Exclaiming that Captain Brown of the local Territorial Army spoke at a public 
meeting, ‘in the event of an order to mobilise, to sanction the ringing of the town’s bell for 
fifteen minutes’.271 The article then claimed that if German naval forces were to sail up the 
River Tay, they could silence the town’s churches.  
Following the resignation of Bülow in 1909 until the publication of ten inflammatory articles in 
the Daily Mail by Robert Blatchford, Anglo-German relations had improved. However, 
Blatchford’s provocative articles led to further misperception of British intentions towards the 
Germans. The German press had previously commented on the recent cordial relations that 
had allowed for a consensus on Anglo-German cooperation in the Congo. Herr von Schoen 
claimed that there was a consensus in the German public, that the Imperial Government 
should pursue a naval ‘understanding’ with Britain. The Blatchford articles devastated the 
improved atmosphere in Anglo-German relations. Goschen reported that ‘since the new 
chancellor came into office repeated and increasing signs have shown themselves that the 
efforts to remove the tension existing between Germany and England are being undertaken 
in the right way’.272 
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Following the release of the Blatchford Report in the Daily Mail, which had caused the 
‘greatest indignation’ in Germany, German born banker and close confidant of Asquith, 
Ernest Cassel, visited Berlin. The timely visit of Cassel, which was noted by William 
Goschen, went some way to repair the damage inflicted on Anglo-German relations caused 
by the press.273 The general feeling in Britain at the time was that an Anglo-German 
‘understanding’ was only possible if Britain were to recognise German naval ambition, 
following the historic German principle of do ut des. The visit of Cassel to Berlin 
demonstrates that officials on both sides of the North Sea strove to maintain peace. 
Blatchford, a socialist journalist, after writing the infamous articles in the Daily Mail, claimed 
that the British were not at fault for the agitation, ‘‘in all my reading of the subject in the 
British press, I have never come across a single article which could be twisted into a threat 
of an attack on Germany.’’274 Although Blatchford maintained he could not find examples of 
polemics in the British press directed at Germany he stated that  
Britain was in grave peril of an attack from the German Empire and calling 
for the immediate introduction of compulsory military training of school 
boys over the age of ten, and a significant expansion of the Royal 
Navy. 275 
Schoen produced an article in the Berliner Tageblatt stating, ‘the great mass of people has 
long been permeated with the feeling that senseless mischief making by a small number in 
both countries is a great misfortune’.276 Naval attaché Commander Dumas, claimed that the 
press was ‘a potent force in maintaining this [hostile] atmosphere’.277  
There is a surfeit of evidence in the British press concerning the German naval threat. The 
subject of a German invasion is discussed in great depth by the naval attaché Philip Dumas. 
Dumas’ expertise allowed him to dismantle the argument and dispel the ‘invasion bogey’ in 
its entirety by outlining which German ports could be used for an attempted invasion. Dumas 
concluded in his report that ‘what it therefore amounts to is that while a raiding expedition is 
possible, an invasion is almost impossible’.278 Therefore the anxiety running through the 
British press and public, although not entirely misplaced, appears futile.   
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The invasion scare fizzled out by 1909, as it later transpired that Germany had only built nine 
Dreadnoughts to Britain’s seventeen. It is evident from the fiasco that the polemics in the 
press perpetuated the misperception of German naval policy. Moreover, the report of 
Commander Dumas stated that there was little or no threat from the German Empire and 
that Blatchford’s report caused misperception of German naval ambition. The fear of 
invasion was not confined to Great Britain. In a letter to Admiral Fisher, the influential writer 
and editor of the Westminster Gazette, J. A. Spencer, informed Fisher that he had become a 
‘bogey’ figure in Germany.279 Whilst Spencer was visiting Germany he was repeatedly 
questioned by officials and members of the public, whether Fisher intended ‘to snap up their 
fleet before it got too big, to repeat the Battle of Copenhagen’.280 This supports the theory of 
Epkenhans who believed British press agitation led to genuine fear in Germany.281 The 
agitation at Kiel amounted to children being kept off school by their parents for fear of a 
British attack. Moreover, Spencer informed Fisher that there were further fears in Berlin of a 
British invasion.282 
*** 
Beyond invasion scares, ‘spy mania’ gripped Britain throughout the Dreadnought Era. There 
is an abundance of polemics in the press in which some alarmist publications claimed that 
up to 50,000 German spies were operating in Britain at any given time.283 Some of these 
rumours were dispelled by the Dundee Evening Telegraph, which suggested that if Germany 
paid their spies just £200 a year, it would cost them tens of millions to operate the spy 
network in Britain alone.284 Articles stating such high numbers of German spies operating in 
Britain were the cause of much consternation. Moreover, reports in the Northern Whig 
suggested that German spies were monitoring Royal Navy manoeuvres in the North Sea 
and that two German spies were caught watching from a bridge. According to an 
undisclosed source, German ‘spies are at almost every seaport, and very clever and wily are 
they in their disguises and methods’.285 It is easy to imagine how quickly polemics in the 
press filtered through society.  
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Moreover, the Belfast Telegraph reported that a female spy had been detained by French 
authorities whilst trying to return to Germany. The article claimed that the spy had operated 
on British soil and was said to be working out of a ‘nest’ of spies in Rosyth.286 Rosyth naval 
base in Scotland was a natural target for would-be spies and consequently members of the 
public would be nervous about such reports. The language used by the publicist is 
inflammatory and designed to instil fear into the public. This was emphasised during a 
speech by Major A.J. Reed of the Perthshire Navy League branch, who stated that the NID 
estimated that there were 1,500 spies operating in Scotland and up to 5,000 in England. The 
London Evening Standard reported that the spies operating in England were mainly 
clustered along the southern and eastern coastlines.287 ‘Spy mania’ gripped Britain to such 
an extent that ordinary civilians were being arrested for spying. The Derby Daily Telegraph 
reported in 1911 that three workers from Wearmouth Coal Company sent to check and 
photograph gauges along the coast were reported and arrested.288 This demonstrates that 
the press were agitating the public and fuelling Teutophobia in Britain. 
*** 
Against the backdrop of the ‘invasion bogey’ and ‘spy mania’, it is well documented that 
there were numerous attempts made by British politicians to come to an ‘understanding’ with 
Germany. Advances made by Britain to form an Anglo-German understanding were not 
widely published in the German Press at the time; this was due to the Imperial Government 
withholding the information. The advances made by British statesman to their German 
counterparts were informal and unofficial. However, the Liberal press believed that the 
Imperial Government should have taken advantage of the situation. William Goschen 
reported that ‘the advanced Liberal press was of course extremely bitter in its criticisms of 
the refusal of the Imperial Government to meet the advances of His Majesty’s 
Government’.289 
The liberal paper of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) ,Vorwärts, attacked the German 
government by taking the ‘latter course; and it cannot be denied that such an agreement 
would have been of great value, not only because both British and German nations would 
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have been thereby spared immense burdens’.290 The SPD paper published articles aimed at 
the Imperial Government in the hope that Anglo-German relations would improve. The 
Liberal paper believed that relations needed to improve, otherwise social reform 
programmes in both nations would be halted due to the strain of armaments. Chillingly, the 
paper predicts that if a solution or understanding is not met, ‘a bloody war may be the result; 
should that occur the responsibility will fall upon the Imperial Government’.291 
 
Public Scandal  
 
Reflecting on previous chapters, it is now pertinent to address scandals in the press and 
study the effects of political pressure groups. It is important to assess how public scandals 
and political pressure groups fostered Anglo-German misperceptions. Scandal could 
contribute directly to the naval arms race and derail improving foreign relations. Moreover, 
scandal could curtail political careers and endanger intra-departmental relations in the 
Admiralty.  
Scandal could contribute directly to the arms race. One of the most intriguing and 
scandalous public affairs in the Dreadnought Era concerns H. H. Mulliner. Mulliner, chair of 
Coventry Ordnance Work, was alarmed by decreasing naval expenditure. Mulliner attributed 
the decrease to the policies of the newly-elected Liberal government. In an attempt to stem 
his decreasing order books, Mulliner deceived Parliament and the public over German naval 
ambitions. His deception led to the 1909 Dreadnought scare. Mulliner’s rhetorical 
pyrotechnics were published in leading newspapers, such as the Daily Mail and The Times 
and had the temerity to play on nationalist sentiments. 
According to Anthony Morris, Mulliner was guilty of stoking up public anxiety by writing 
Teutophobic publications to create new orders for his company, supporting the theory 
outlined by A.J.A Morris in Scaremongers.292 Shockingly, Mulliner writes comprehensive 
articles to press outlets, culminating in a series of publications in The Times. On January 3rd, 
1909 a diary titled ‘Diary of the Great Surrender’ was published alongside a detailed article 
outlining the government’s naval policy.293 Mulliner attacks the government asserting their 
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naval policy ‘from the first has been one either of culpable or criminal neglect’.294 It is evident 
from these publications that Mulliner was able to use his position as leverage in the press to 
garner support for his policy. It is indisputable from CID meetings that the government were 
not neglecting Britain’s naval policy.295   
The hyperbolic publications written by Mulliner led to a campaign to increase naval 
estimates, an increase in the building programme and an acceleration of the current building 
programme. Interestingly, the actions of Mulliner draw parallels with the theory provided by 
Herwig that German antagonists aimed to increase their order books through fear. The 
polemics in the press also led to parliamentary outbursts from numerous MPs who wanted to 
increase the annual naval budget. Cries of ‘we want eight and we won’t wait’, rang around 
the house throughout 1909.296 Marder’s Scapa provided criticisms of Mulliner’s actions and 
subsequent name he acquired, the ‘merchant of death’.297 It is evident from the research that 
Mulliner was falsifying claims and directly antagonised political and public thinking by 
implying that Britain was at risk of German attack. It has been demonstrated by reports 
issued by Commander Dumas that it would be nearly impossible for Germany to launch as 
invasion of Britain. Mulliner’s actions exacerbated the issue of Anglo-German misperception 
playing on nationalist sentiment and further alienating both British and German publics. 
When his role was exposed, the resulting scandal led to the resignation of H.H Mulliner, with 
the full backing of the board. Mulliner received a pay out of £100,000.298   
*** 
Scandal could be used to derail attempts at improving foreign relations. One of the 
prominent scandals of the Dreadnought Era involved an interview with Kaiser Wilhelm II on 
October 28th1908. The article, published in the Daily Telegraph, outlined a supposed 
interview with Kaiser Wilhelm II and produced a cause celebre in Germany. The Kaiser was 
described by reports as having an unusual frankness about him, brandishing the English 
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‘mad as march hares.’299 The Times correspondent reported that the original purpose of the 
interview was to allay the fears of Englishmen. The Kaiser suggested in the interview that his 
task was not easy as the ‘prevailing sentiment among large sections of the middle and lower 
classes of my own people is not friendly to England’.300 
The Times labelled the Emperor as ‘impulsive and passes so rapidly from one mood to 
another that he is himself often apt to forget in a later mood what he had done and thought 
in an earlier mood’.301 According to German officials, the interview with the Kaiser was not 
intended to interfere with the recent cordial Anglo-French relations. The interview with the 
Kaiser also had the undesired effect of straining German-Japanese relations. Throughout 
the interview the Kaiser mentioned the ‘yellow peril’, alluding to the Japanese in the Far 
East, noting that the German naval build-up was intended to meet the Japanese naval 
program. The Tokyo correspondent for the New York Herald described the anger felt in 
Japan, stating that ‘the Japanese press vigorously criticises the German Emperor’s 
utterances.’302  
Moreover, the Kaiser stressed that the official German stance on its naval programme was 
purely for commercial expansion and imperial defence and should not in any way be viewed 
by the British as a threat. According to Goschen, the scandal caused ‘a great many violent 
expressions of opinion against Great Britain and especially her press’.303 To combat the 
polemics, practically every political party inside the Reichstag came out in support of friendly 
relations with Britain.304 It is evident from the correspondence and official stance taken by 
the Imperial Government that the views expressed in the interview were not the official policy 
of the government. The repercussions of the Daily Telegraph Affair sent shockwaves around 
the world. The embarrassment felt by the Kaiser was insurmountable as the scandal resulted 
in the alienation of France, Russia, Britain, Japan and the German public. The Kaiser 
suffered serious bouts of depression after the scandal; the interview deeply harmed the 
Emperor’s prestige and subsequently never held the same influence over German foreign 
policy.  
*** 
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Scandal could be also used as a weapon in intra-departmental politics. On October 
25th1909, an article appeared in The Times which would threaten the credibility of the 
Admiralty and Admiral Fisher. The publication, outlined in Marder’s Scapa, questioned the 
policies adopted by the Admiralty throughout Fisher’s ‘revolution’.305 The infamous article 
was produced by Rear Admiral Charles Beresford, opposed to Fisher’s reforms, and was 
originally destined for Asquith. The publication threw the Royal Navy in to disrepute and tore 
it into two camps, with a third neutral camp. Amusingly, those who backed Fisher were said 
to be swimming in the ‘fish pond’.306 The article successfully undermined the authority of 
Fisher and the Admiralty. The malcontent Beresford sat as a Member of Parliament for 
Portsmouth in the 1910 General Election, where he became increasingly critical of Admiralty 
policy and Fisher’s obstinate behaviour. Competition for promotion provided the catalyst for 
the froideur between Fisher and Beresford, exacerbated by the disagreement over the 1906 
redistribution of the fleet. Beresford’s public attack was described by Marder as 
‘unparalleled’ in naval history.307  
Beresford noted in his article that he regretted making the letter public. ‘As noted in my letter 
of July 20, it is deplorable that it is necessary to make public this correspondence, but I have 
no other means of protecting my brother officers’.308 However, it seems that Beresford did 
not dwell on it for too long. The publication led to an inquiry into Admiralty policy and the 
leadership of Fisher. Beresford came under attack in the papers, the Eastern Daily Press 
suggested that ‘Beresford has come home with the intention, if we may be pardoned, for 
employing a vulgar but finely descriptive phase of ‘making it hot’ for the Admiralty and Sir 
John Fisher’.309 The paper also stated that Beresford would use his political influence to 
pressurise the government into purchasing an increased number of Dreadnoughts. 
Conversely, the Dundee Courier defended Beresford’s actions by suggesting that he was 
duty bound to ‘tell the truth’, even at the expense of discrediting Fisher and the Admiralty.310 
It is evident from the pyrotechnics in the press that the inquiry was a cause celebre in Britain. 
Moreover, the Fisher-Beresford spat split public and service opinion undermining service 
morale. The divisive affair left Fisher discredited and although he did not resign in the 
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immediate aftermath, it soon transpired his position had become untenable. In late 1910 
Fisher received his peerage and retired, only to be recalled in 1914 when war broke out. The 
scandal demonstrates the power of the press and how influential figures, such as Beresford, 
utilised newspapers for their own purpose. 
*** 
Numerous scandals plagued the German hierarchy at the turn of the century. One of the 
prominent scandals hit when it transpired that the Imperial Foreign Office had formerly 
employed the political section of the police to spy on journalists. The scandal widened when 
it was noticed that the political section of the police then hired journalists to write 
sensationalist articles which led to elaborate investigations against individuals.311 George 
Saunders reported that ‘the German journalist is usually so dependent upon the authorities 
for his daily bread in the shape of information that it is generally possible to use him for the 
government’s purpose’.312 Conflicting articles in the German press can also be attributed to 
certain journalists taking aim at the hand that fed them. Semi-official newspapers would 
sometimes contain scathing attacks on government officials who had ‘stumbled badly’ and 
fallen foul of a journalist.313 The number of ‘tame’ journalists began to dwindle throughout the 
early twentieth century as national and provincial newspapers such as the Frankfurt Zeitung 
and the Kölnische Zeitung became incredibly wealthy and independent from government 
favour and influence. This may exacerbate the wider of issue of misperception as ‘their anti-
British sentiment is dictated by the feelings of their readers.’314 
A further scandal came to light in 1906 when it transpired that ‘many papers speak of plans 
for relieving the Chancellor and Minister President Bülow of his work’.315 In a meeting with 
Frank Lascelles, Bülow notified the diplomat that ‘such violent articles chiefly in the papers 
which had indulged in such vile criticisms of England during the Boer War’.316 Bülow also 
stated that he hoped the attacks on himself and the Emperor ‘would prove to the British 
people that the control which the German government could exercise over the press was not 
so complete as they supposed.’317 A ‘great change had come over the German press and 
that even in respectable newspapers criticisms of the Government and of the Emperor were 
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continually to be found’.318 There were further attacks on the regime throughout the year, 
mainly occurring in the press after the summer break of 1906. Both liberal and conservative 
press organs attacked the government with the Reichsbote publishing an article hoping the 
Emperor would consider a thoughtful early retirement (gedankenreiche Zurückhaltung).319 
In June 1910, the Imperial Government held its annual foreign office conference. The budget 
was a controversial topic in Germany. The German tabloids turned their broadsides on each 
other regarding the possibility of altering the German naval programme. The government 
and more liberal press outlets campaigned for an economic understanding with Great 
Britain. The nationalist press and navalists lambasted the liberals over a potential 
understanding with Britain. Government policy in Germany was attacked by the nationalists 
and likened the policies as ‘feminine’.320 Differing opinions regarding armaments also 
appeared in the press. William Goschen described ‘a violent controversy which lasted 
months arose as to whether public opinion in Germany was in favour of a modification of the 
German naval programme’.321 It is clear from the temerity and contradictory nature of the 
German press that the nationalist factions were far more Anglophobic than the government 
wished. 
*** 
This section has demonstrated that the IR theory of ‘misperception’ was fluid and multipolar, 
and that misperceptions of foreign policy were rife across the Continent. German relations 
with Denmark, Norway and Italy were all strained by fabricated publications in the press. 
This was particularly evident when an article in the British press attacking German foreign 
policy was blamed on the Belgian King, who was visiting London at the time. In 
correspondence to the Foreign Office, it transpired that the writer of the article was Professor 
Vambery. It is also evident that both the German and British governments utilised journalists 
for their own purposes and were aware of misperception. Prince Bülow’s relationship with 
Stein being one of the vital links Bülow had with the press. The research also concludes that 
there is a clear distinction in the style of reporting from liberal and nationalist papers. 
Journalists throughout Germany also grappled with toeing the government line and their own 
personal feelings towards Britain. It is evident that the press caused a misperception through 
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public scandal, however it is now pertinent to address the role of the press apropos ‘spy 
mania’ and the ‘invasion bogey’. 
It is evident from the research that public scandals had a profound effect on foreign relations, 
political careers and the Anglo-German arms race. This is perhaps epitomised by the Daily 
Telegraph Scandal and the Kaiser. The interview tarnished the Kaiser’s reputation and also 
strained Anglo-German and also relations with Japan.322 The Kaiser suffered serious bouts 
of depression and never fully regained the respect of his public. Moreover, Frank Lascelles 
report outlined the hostility of the German press towards the Kaiser and Chancellor. 
Furthermore, armaments manufacturer H.H. Mulliner used the press to fill the company’s 
order books. Moreover, Mulliner mis-led the public and Parliament into believing Germany 
posed a greater threat than it did.  
The research highlights the conflicting nature of the press when reporting on the Beresford 
scandal. Some journalists believed that Beresford acted in the best interests of the Senior 
Service by bringing his concerns to public attention, others did not. What is notable though, 
is that the scandal led to the retirement of Admiral Fisher, who had revolutionised the Royal 
Navy and it is clear that public scandal had a far-reaching effect on foreign policy. 
The fear of invasion in Britain reached fever pitch in 1910. Moreover, the threat of spies 
operating throughout the British Isles caused great concern. However, it is evident that had 
Commander Dumas’ report been published that the issue of the ‘invasion bogey’ would have 
subsided. Dumas asserted that Germany could only mount a raiding party and that Imperial 
Navy did not have the capacity to fulfil a full-scale invasion.323  The research also indicates 
that the fear of invasion was not limited to Britain. Fears that Britain may launch a pre-
emptive strike on Germany, reminiscent of the Napoleonic Wars, kept German 
schoolchildren from school and some families fleeing coastal regions. It is evident that Lord 
Northcliffe and his papers were guilty of stoking tensions by publishing invasion literature. 
Northcliffe personally commissioned a series of articles depicting the invasion of Britain, 
playing on the fears of the public. 
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Chapter V. Conclusion 
 
The research conducted throughout this paper has traced the relationship between the press 
organs of Britain and Germany and foreign policy. The thesis provides an interdisciplinary 
approach to the Anglo-German arms race incorporating the IR theory of the ‘spiral model’ 
and the press. The thesis demonstrates that the polemics of both sides of the North Sea led 
to misperceptions in certain situations. Of note, was the spy mania which gripped Britain 
throughout 1909 to 1911. As mentioned, Britain’s attempts to provide security and protect its 
trade routes, essential for the maintenance of its empire, left Germany in a state of 
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insecurity. Moreover, the navy laws passed in Germany designed to protect its imperial 
interests and secure its place in the world, left Britain in a state of insecurity. It is evident 
from a range of sources that the press exacerbated an Anglo-German misperception, which 
led to the belief in some German circles that the British were actively advocating a policy of 
German isolation and encirclement.324 Although there were cases of misperception 
throughout the Dreadnought Era, it is evident that Germany did pose a naval threat to 
Britain, however the thesis demonstrates that the threat was exacerbated by the press.  
British actions in the Balkan and Moroccan crises came under intense scrutiny in the 
German press which claimed that the British were seeking to curtail German power in the 
region. According to British diplomatic correspondence, the hyperbole in the German press 
caused such a stir that both the British and Russians were forced to explain the Anglo-
Russian Convention to their German counterparts and reassure that their motives were not 
directed against Germany.325 Schiemann at the Kreuzzeitung suggested that British had 
conjured up rumours of German aggression to justify their actions on the continent.326 
Moreover, numerous ‘fringe’ papers in Germany produced articles stating that the British 
were pursuing a policy of einkreisung which filtered through into the mainstream of the 
German press, influencing public opinion.327   
The thesis began by outlining the Anglo-German naval arms race which underpinned the 
Dreadnought Era, providing a brief background of British naval power and the advent of the 
German challenge. The thesis then viewed the arms race through a press angle and argued 
that publications in the press exacerbated the situation. The Boer War which straddled the 
nineteenth and twentieth century is then addressed and demonstrates the Anglophobic 
nature of the German press throughout the conflict. Moreover, the research also highlights 
the issue of individualism apropos journalists. In Chapter II, the case study of the Second 
Boer War demonstrates that journalists held differing views on Germany, tying in with the 
theories of threat perception. Saunders and Chirol held opposing views on who they 
perceived to be the greatest threat to Britain.  
The thesis utilised a mixture of national, local and regional papers to portray the hostility and 
polemics of the British press towards Germany. The thesis also addressed Anglophobic 
polemics in the German press which were included in transcripts in Foreign Office reports. 
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Although not directly attributable to the outbreak of the First World War, the misperception 
caused by the press in Britain and Germany caused insecurity in both countries. It is also 
evident that the press distorted Anglo- German foreign policies and created an atmosphere 
of misperception. The new wave of journalism and their press barons put Germany and 
Britain on an unavoidable collision course. As discussed in the thesis, notable characters 
such as Lord Northcliffe stood to gain financially from war. There is a surfeit of examples of 
polemics in both countries’ newspapers throughout the Dreadnought Era, which in some 
cases led to misperceptions.  
Coupled with political pressure groups, such as the Navy League, the press formed a 
formidable opponent to peace, able to exert influence over public opinion and foreign policy. 
With politicians and press barons able to pursue their agendas through the medium of 
newspapers, it is evident that newspaper proprietors wielded immense power. One of the 
key examples of press hyperbole is demonstrated by the invasion scares and spy scandals 
that rocked the public. The polemics concerning spy mania in the British press led to a direct 
misperception of German naval ambition. The topic of the 1909 invasion scare differs from 
the concept of spy mania, in that Germany did pose a naval threat to Britain. However, this 
threat was exacerbated by the British press. The thesis provided numerous accounts of 
publications in the press accusing Germany of spying and planning to invade the British 
Isles. The fabricated publications are torn apart by Dumas, German naval attaché, 
throughout a detailed Foreign Office report on the Imperial Navy. Dumas asserts that aside 
from potential small-scale raids, it would be impossible for Germany to launch an invasion of 
Britain.328 However, his expertise is overshadowed by hyperbole in the press, whipping up 
public agitation and fear as demonstrated in British articles. The fear created in the articles 
created a misperception of the German people, who were equally fearful that Admiral Fisher 
was planning on attacking Germany. Polemics issued in the German press sent panic 
throughout the city of Kiel that a British attack was imminent. Consequently, school children 
were kept at home and some families fled the city. 
The case study dedicated to the Boer War, which introduces George Saunders, addresses 
the polemics in the German press towards Britain throughout the conflict. Moreover, 
Saunders provided a fantastic insight into the German press facilitated in a report. The report 
outlined the political leanings and circulations of national and regional newspapers in 
Germany. Moreover, the report contained information on any subventions German 
newspapers received from the government. The research demonstrates that some elements 
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of the British press blamed Germany for prolonging the war and the Kaiser’s telegram in 
1896 as a catalyst.329  
Numerous political scandals litter the Dreadnought Era. The Mulliner Scandal and Beresford 
Inquiry provide the starkest examples of how the press were utilised by individuals for the 
own purposes. The Mulliner Scandal provided a key example of misperception. The thesis 
outlined the relationship between the journalists and Admiralty figures such as Fisher and 
Stead. Moreover, the thesis sought to demonstrate the control the German government 
could exert over the press. As mentioned, one key concern of German officials was 
misperception caused by the press. According to Foreign Office reports and 
correspondence, the German government piled pressure on newspapers and journalists 
alike to curtail the polemics against Britain with wavering effect. There are numerous 
occasions where this tactic failed, and a strange phenomenon appeared where papers 
would openly switch between supporting and attacking the government, contradicting 
themselves entirely, sometimes in the same article. Papers which received government 
subventions were particularly susceptible to this phenomenon.  
Other notable findings include the differing nature of nationalist and liberal papers. Arguably, 
the disputatious nature of the German press harmed Anglo-German relations and 
exacerbated rising tensions. One of the key methodological issues the thesis has had to 
overcome concerns bias. There is no easy fix as the historian can only utilise the resources 
to hand. The Foreign Office reports have been selected by individuals, as alluded to in the 
introduction, who may have wished to pursue a certain agenda. Issues of poor translation 
and motives of those selecting the articles are methodological issues that the historian has 
to be aware of. It is therefore difficult to firmly ascertain the nature of German press through 
these reports.  
For historians, awareness of the press when researching IR theory is immensely important. 
The combination of IR theory and press history have provided a unique angle to the 
historiography of the Anglo-German naval arms race. The thesis has highlighted potential 
further areas of research including the relationship between the press and foreign policy 
throughout the First World War. Did the press protract the war? It would also be interesting 
to assess the spiral model and potential other models within the same methodological 
approach to the First World War. Despite the duplicitous nature of politicians and the press, 
Bülow’s speech to the Reichstag in 1906 stated that he hoped Britain and Germany would 
never engage in a war on opposing sides. But despite the best efforts of diplomats and 
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statesman, by August 1914 Britain and Germany were engaged in one of the bloodiest wars 
in history. Tragically, Bülow stated in 1906 that he ‘renewed the hope to which the Emperor 
gave expression at Kiel in 1904, that the flags of the two nations would never wave in 
hostility against each other’.330  
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Appendix 
 
Principal Characters 
 
George Saunders – Saunders served as a journalist with The Times in Berlin. Saunders 
forewarned the British press about the hostile nature of the German tabloids. His presence in 
Germany was unwelcome by some German officials who believed his articles would cause a 
misperception.  
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Sir Fairfax Cartwright – served as Ambassador to Austria- Hungary prior to the First World 
War. Cartwright was a diplomat and author. His correspondence has been used extensively 
for the purpose of the paper.  
Sir Edward Grey – Longest serving Foreign Office Secretary from 1905 to 1916. Grey was 
the main driving force behind British foreign policy throughout the Dreadnought Era to the 
First World War. The majority of Foreign Office files utilised for the research are addressed 
to Grey. Grey produced literature on foreign policy and his career.  
Sir Frank Lascelles – Lascelles served as Ambassador to Russia and Germany for the 
Foreign Office. Lascelles oversaw the estrangement between Britain and Germany. He had 
always maintained cordial relations with the Kaiser but detested the policies of Bülow. He 
resigned from his position in 1908 but still held significant clout over Anglo-German relations.  
Valentine Chirol – Chirol was described by The Times as a prolific journalist and author, 
Chirol was an ardent nationalist and believed firmly in the British Empire. He foresaw 
German expansionism and Muslim unrest as the key dangers to the empire.  
Admiral Fisher – Lord Fisher served as Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean 
Squadron before returning to England as First Sea Lord. His notable reforms of the Royal 
Navy, including redistribution, the nucleus crew system and scrapping obsolete vessels. His 
divisive reforms are still providing a historiographical debate to this day. Arthur Marder 
produced Fear God and Dread Nought, a book containing Fisher’s private correspondence.  
Winston Churchill – Known as the famous war time leader of Great Britain, Churchill 
served as the First Lord of the Admiralty… He was known to take an active role in naval 
matters unlike his predecessors. Churchill routinely toured ships and spoke to officers about 
naval tactics. Churchill would oversee the disastrous Gallipoli Campaign in the First World 
War.  
Bernard Heinrich von Bülow – Bülow served as Chancellor of the German Empire from 
1900 to 1909. Instrumental figure who oversaw German affairs until his resignation in 1909. 
On numerous occasions Bülow stated that he wished Britain and Germany could live side by 
side cordially. He maintained good relations with Sir Frank Lascelles throughout the period.   
Friedrich von Holstein – Succeeded Bismarck in 1890 and spent thirty years shaping 
German foreign policy as head of the political department. Holstein believed that Germany 
would never be safe whilst they expanded the Imperial Navy. He therefore believed that an 
‘understanding’ with Britain was key. 
Theobald Bethmann-Hollweg - Bethmann-Hollweg succeeded Bülow as Chancellor of the 
German Empire. His tenure ran from 1909 to 1917. His main policy was to achieve a political 
and naval understanding with Britain, as he viewed the arms race as ruinous.  
Reginald Tower – Tower was a British diplomat who served from the 1880s to 1920. 
Tower’s reports from Munich on the subject of German newspapers proved vital to the 
thesis.  
Friedrich Rosen – Rosen was a German politician and diplomat. His liberal views made him 
the ideal person to try and reach an ‘understanding’ with Britain. He served as the Foreign 
Minister in the Weimar Republic in 1921.   
Alfred von Kinderlen Waechter – Waechter served as head of the German foreign office 
from 1910 to 1912. He oversaw the Agadir Crisis and was known to act recklessly. 
Throughout the crisis his sabre-rattling caused agitation in the nationalist press.  
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Sir William Goschen – Goschen was a British diplomat who served as Ambassador to 
Germany from 1908 to 1914, succeeding Frank Lascelles. Goschen previously served as 
Ambassador to Vienna and Copenhagen.  
Captain Philip Dumas (RN) – Dumas provides a fantastic insight into the German Navy 
through a series of reports derived from his time spent as naval attaché to Germany. Dumas 
was an influential character who advised the government on the naval situation inside 
Germany.  
Captain Percy Scott (RN) – Percy Scott was a Royal Navy officer who was committed to 
improving gunnery practice and aim correction. He pioneered new tactics and heavily 
influenced Admiral Fisher’s view on gunnery practice. Scott published a letter in the press, 
criticising the lack of support he received from the Admiralty.  
H. H. Mulliner – Mulliner was the proprietor of an armaments company, under Northcliffe’s 
discretion, Mulliner produced a series of publications aimed at scaring the British public in to 
believing Germany posed an invasion threat. The public pressurised the government into 
increasing defence expenditure and the number of ships in the fleet, which Mulliner was all 
too happy to supply.   
Count Aehrenthal – Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister who infamously duped his Russian 
counterpart Izvolsky apropos the First Balkan Crisis.  
Cecil Spring-Rice – British diplomat who served as Ambassador to the United States from 
1912 to 1918. He oversaw the end of American neutrality in the First World War. Spring-Rice 
married the daughter of Frank Lascelles, Florence Caroline Lascelles. He also oversaw the 
British response to the 1905 Russian Revolution and crafted the early staged of the 1907 
Anglo-Russian Convention.  
Reginald McKenna – Liberal politician who served as First Lord of the Admiralty. He also 
served as Chancellor of the Exchequer. McKenna was instrumental in avoiding cuts to the 
defence budget. He became a target of the liberal left who were not in favour of  
William Palmer, Lord Selbourne – Selbourne was a British politician and colonial 
administrator. In November 1900, he served as First Lord of the Admiralty. He also served 
under Joseph Chamberlain as Colonial Secretary.  
Edward Marjoribanks, 2nd Baron Lord Tweedmouth – Served as a British politician as a 
moderate liberal. Tweedmouth, also served as First Sea Lord of the Admiralty from 1905 to 
1908. Tweedmouth found himself at the centre of a political storm when it transpired, he was 
discussing the British naval programme with the Kaiser.  
Frederick Campbell, 3rd Baron Lord Cawdor – Cawdor preceded Tweedmouth as First 
Sea Lord of the Admiralty, serving in 1905, his tenure was cut short due to the Conservative 
government losing power in December 1905.  
Adolf Marschall von Bieberstein – Bieberstein was a German politician. He served as the 
State Secretary of the German Empire. A fierce nationalist who supported a strong German 
Navy, he led the delegation at the Second Hague Conference in 1907. 
Herr August Stein – Stein was a journalist at the Frankfurt Gazette, the second largest 
newspaper outside of Berlin. Stein was a close confidant of Bernard Heinrich von Bülow. 
John Francis Charles, 7th Count de Salis-Soglio – John Francis Charles served as a 
British diplomat in a long and distinguished career.  
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Lord Charles Hardinge – Hardinge served as Ambassador to Russia from 1904 to 1906. 
Upon his return to Britain, he received a promotion and served as the Permeant Under 
Secretary at the Foreign Office. Hardinge refused a post to become Ambassador to United 
States and instead oversaw the transition of the Indian capital from Calcutta to Delhi in which 
an attempt on his life was made by Indian nationalists.  
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Title Page of the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung. Thursday 21st December 1911  
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Copy of Foreign Office Extract of the Neueste Nachrichten  
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